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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction existed in the district court under Utah Code§ 78A-5-102(1).
Appellate jurisdiction exists under Utah Code§ 78A-4-103(2)Q).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE No.

1: Evidence not considered in the trial court cannot be considered on appeal.

Chuck's standing argument relies entirely on evidence that the trial court deemed
untimely and refused to consider. The court deemed the evidence untimely because it was
available the day the lawsuit was filed but was not offered until six years after litigation
began and nearly a year after trial. Can Chuck's standing argument prevail where there is ·
no evidence available to support it?

Standard of Review for Issue No.1: Challenges to standing are reviewed using
the standard for a dispositive motion at the relevant stage of litigation. 1 In addition,
factual findings that affect standing are reviewed for abuse of discretion, while legal
determinations that affect standing are reviewed for correctness. 2

Preservation: This argument was not preserved. While standing is a jurisdictional
issue that cannot be waived, for all intents and purposes Chuck waived this particular
standing argument by failing to timely offer evidence to support it. Evidence supporting
this argument was not offered until nearly a year after trial and the trial court refused to
consider it. 3
ISSUE No. 2: The FSBO states that the Seller agrees to pay a commission if the Seller

Brown v. Div. of Water Rights, 2010 UT 14, ,r 15,228 P.3d 747.
Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, ,r 10, 154 P.3d 808 (internal citations omitted).
3 See pp. 12-16, infra.
1

2

accepts an offer from the Buyer. It is undisputed that the Seller accepted an offer from the

,c,

Buyer. Did the trial court err in ruling that the Seller was obligated to pay a commission?

Standard of Review for Issue No. 2: A district court's grant of summary
judgment is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness. 4

Preservation: In his opening brief, Chuck asserts two arguments against summary
judgment, but only one argument was preserved. First, Chuck argues that he was liable
for a commission only if the sale was prevented by the Seller's default and that, as a
matter of law, the Seller did not default. 5 But none of Chuck's record cites indicate that
Chuck made this argument opposing summary judgment. Thus this argument was not
preserved.
Chuck's second argument is that no commission was earned because the buyer did
not meet the "ready, willing, and able" standard. This argument was preserved.
ISSUE No. 3: The jury verdict finding Chuck personally liable may be overturned only if

no evidence supports the verdict. Aspenwood's agent testified at trial that Chuck said he
would pay the commission. In addition, the FSBO and REPC in this case name Chuck as
the Seller, but do not name Still Standing as a contracting party and do not express that
Chuck is acting on behalf of Still Standing. Is there evidence to support the jury's
verdict?

Standard of Review for Issue No. 3: A jury verdict may be disturbed only if the
evidence so clearly favors the appellant that reasonable people would not differ on the

Insight Assets, Inc. v. Farias, 2013 UT 47, ,i 7, 321 P.3d 1021 (internal citation
omitted).
5 Br. of Appellant, pp. 43-47.
4

2

outcome of the case. 6

Preservation: Chuck preserved the issue of his personal liability, but did not
preserve the majority of the arguments made in his opening brief. When Chuck moved
for summary judgment, he made three very specific and limited arguments:

1)

The FSBO states that the listed seller "represents all of the record owners
of the Property." Still Standing owned the Property. Therefore Chuck
was representing Still Standing as an agent. 7

-2}-

The REPC describes the Property as "Land LLC Still Standing Stables."
This shows that Still Standing, not Chuck, is the seller. 8

3)

An agent can be personally liable for a contract only if the .agent clearly
indicates that the liability was the agent's alone. Chuck did not clearly
indicate that the liability was his alone. 9

Chuck does not raise the first argument on appeal. He does raise the second and
third argument, but also rais~s several additional arguments such as references to title
searches 8:lld correspondence between the parties. These arguments were not raised when
:.;;

Chuck moved for summary judgment and they were not raised at trial. Thus these
additional arguments were not preserved for appeal.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Determinative provisions are set forth in Appellant's Brief.

4J

v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2013 UT App 226, 1 7, 311 P .3d 564.
R. at 1424.
8 Id.
9 R. at 1424-25.
6 Proctor

7

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE

This appeal arises out of a real estate brokerage's attempt to colleGt a commission.
The real estate brokerage consists of Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation, Elite Legacy
Corporation, and their principal broker Skip Wing (this brief refers to these parties
collectively as Aspenwood or the Aspenwood Plaintiffs). Aspenwood alleged that it
entered into a For-Sale-By-Owner Commission Agreement with the defendants Still
Standing Stable, LC, Chuck Schvaneveldt, and Cathy Code, and that Aspenwood earned
a commission under that FSBO agreement.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW

The course of proceedings is long and complicated. This summary attempts to
include only the proceedings relevant to this appeal.

In November, 2006, "Remax Elite" (a dba designation) filed a petition seeking
declaratory relief regarding whether Remax Elite should deliver earnest money to the
buyer or the seller after a failed real estate transaction. 10 Later Remax Elite asserted a
claim against Still Standing, Chuck, and Cathy claiming that Remax had earned a
commission by bringing an offer that the seller accepted. 11 The defendants tenaciously
opposed Remax's capacity to sue them, claiming in at least nine pretrial motions that
"Remax Elite," as nothing more than a dba designation, did not have standing to sue. 12

R. at 1-4.
R. at 660-64.
12 R.at1166-96; 1256-83; 1407-62;2068-104;2120-36;2390-414;2548-53;261422; 2653-60.
10
11

4

Specifically, the defendants argued that only Remax Elite's principal broker Skip Wing
could sue to recover the commission. 13 At one point, Chuck even submitte_d a summary
judgment motion asserting as undisputed fact that Skip Wing was Remax Elite's principal
broker and the only principal broker involved in the transaction. 14
Eventually these motions were resolved by adding the Aspenwood plaintiffs (i.e.,
,..;,,

Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation, Elite Legacy Corporation, and their principal broker
Skip Wing). 1~ After Aspenwood was added, the defendants abandoned these standing ·
arguments. 16

In the meantime, Aspenwood moved for summary judgment on all claims against
it. 17 These claims included tort claims based on alleged misconduct by Tim Shea,
_;,

Aspenwood's real estate agent involved i:1;1 the transaction. 18 Aspenwood argued that the
tort claims failed because Still Standing could not establish causation. 19 Specifically,
Aspenwood argued that the transaction failed because the Seller refused to provide a
general warranty deed as required by the REPC. 20
The trial court agreed with Aspenwood and clearly understood that the Seller's
failure to provide a general warranty deed was critical: "[I]sn't it the prerogative of a
buyer to spurn a special warranty deed if he feels insecure and say the only condition to

Id.
14 R. at 1408.
15 R. at 3591-604.
16 R. at 7015 .
17 R. at 2887-89.
18 R. at 842-49.
19 R. at 2920-23.
20 R. at 2913-16; 2922; 8389, pp. 8:4-7, 15:7-19.
13

.iJ

5

purchasing this is a general warranty deed? Isn't that his right?"21
Chuck ignores this in his opening brief. He correctly points out that the trial court
stated that the deal failed solely because of a lack of insurable access. But it was always
understood that the lack of access killed the deal because the lack of access prevented the
Seller from delivering a general warranty deed:

..

'~·

[I]t is undisputed that the lack of a guaranteed access was the sole
reason ... that the transaction failed .... [I]t strains credulity to think that
somebody would fork over four million without a general.warranty deed or
at least some kind of a guarantee under a special warranty deed that there
would be an access. 22

-·· ., ...

This understanding of why the deal failed is bolstered by Tim Shea's trial testimony that
the Buyer would have bought the Property if Chuck had provided a general warranty
deed. 23
After the trial court dismissed the claims against Aspenwood, all that remained
was Aspenwood's commission claim against Still Standing, Chuck, and Cathy. Chuck
attempted to avoid liability on the commission claim by moving for summary judgment.24
He claimed that he could not be liable for the commission because he was involved in the
deal only as Still Standing's representative. 25 Chuck also argued that because the REPC
describes the Property as "Land LLC Still Standing Stables" Chuck was entitled to
judgment as a matter oflaw that he was not personally liable.2 6 The court denied this

21

R. at 8389, p. 21:13-16.
R. at 8389, p. 53:1-7.
23 R. at 8385, p. 136:2-19.
24 R. at 1407-11.
25 R. at 1424-25.

22

26

Id.
6

.-~
\$1

motion, stating that the fact the FSBO identifies Chuck as the seller, without indicating
that he was acting in a representative capacity, sufficed to overcome Chuck's motion. 27
Aspenwood eventually prevailed on the commission claim through a combination
of partial summary judgment and a jury verdict. Aspenwood's motion for partial
summary judgment asked the court to rule as a matter of law that a commission had been
earned. 28 The motion did not address which defendant would be liable to pay the
commission, reserving that issue for a later motion or for trial. 29

.,::.,.:·

In supporting the motion, Aspenwood provided an affidavit from the Buyer and an
affidavit from the Buyer's lender demonstrating that the Buyer had secured the necessary

°

funding to purchase the Property and was ready to proceed with the deal.3 Chuck did not
.J>

offer any evidence to refute the suggestion that the Buyer had obtained the necessary
financing and was ready to proceed with the deal. 31 Instead, Chuck argued that he never
accepted an offer because he believed that the transaction would be a cash transaction.32
The trial court rejected this argument for three reasons: I) the REPC integrated all prior
discussions into a final, written agreement and the REPC states that the transaction would

.;;;

be financed; 33 2) the source of financing was irrelevant to Chuck and Chuck had offered
no evidence that the Buyer would not have obtained financing; 34 and 3) the argument

27

R. at I 890.
28 R. at 1511-12.
Id.
30 R. at 1547-97.
31 R. at 3658.
32 R. at 8382, pp. 31:20-33:8.
33 R. at 8382, p. 28: 10-22.
34 R. at 8382, pp. 29:8-32:4.
29

-iii

7

relied on claims of fraud, which Chuck waived by not pleading fraud as a defense. 35
In the end, the trial court granted Aspenwood's motion, reasoning that under the
plain language of the FSBO Aspenwood had done everything it needed to do to earn a
commission. 36 The court (correctly) did not analyze whether the Buyer was ready,
willing, and able, but reached its conclusion based on the plain language of the
commission provision. 37 Aspenwood argued, and the trial court agreed, that the Seller
became obligated to pay a commission the moment that the Seller accepted an offer. 38
With liability decided, the only remaining issue was which defendant, if any, would be
held liable.
The question of which defendant would be liable was resolved in several steps,
both before and during the trial. Just before trial, it appears that the parties (all plaintiffs
and all defendants) stipulated to dismissing Still Standing on two conditions: 1) liability
would be determined between Chuck and Cathy; and 2) Chuck and Cathy would not be
allowed to argue that Still Standing was liable. 39
At this pretrial hearing, the judge suggested to Aspenwood that it dismiss Still
Standing.40 The court believed that Aspenwood did not have a solid case against Still
Standing and that leaving Still Standing in the case would confuse the jury. 41 In addition,
the court stated that if Still Standing was left in the case then Chuck and Cathy would be
35

R.
R.
37 R.
38 R.
39 R.
40 R.
36

41

at 8382, pp. 78:22-79:3.
at 8382, p. 77:15-25; see also R. at 5611; 8384, p. 72:4-14, 8385, p. 219:11-13.
at 8382, p. 77:15-25.
at 1517-19; 8382, p. 77:15-25.
at 8383, pp. 16:8-18:15. Ex. B, Addendum.
at 8383, pp. 12:16-13:11.

Id.
8

allowed to argue to the jury that Still Standing was the party liable to par the
commission. 42
At that point, Aspenwood agreed to release Still Standing on the condition that
liability would be determined between Chuck and Cathy:
The only reason at this point in time we still have the LLC involved
is because the last thing we want to do is go to trial, let the LLC out and
have the argument be, they should have gone after the LLC .... [I]fwe
have a stipulation here that the LLC is off limits ... we'll stipulate to that.
If all we can have now is a trial as to ... Chuck Schvaneveldt and Cathy
Code's liability on this and they can't throw blame at an empty chair, we
won't pursue Still Standing Stables. 43
The court then asked whether the parties would accept an instruction to the jury
stating that Still Standing was not liable and the jury could look only to Chuck and Cathy

~

for liability. 44 Chuck and Cathy did not object. 45 Aspenwood, on the other hand, indicated
it would accept the instruction only if Chuck and Cathy would honor that instruction by
not arguing or presenting evidence that Still Standing was the liable party. 46 Aspenwood
repeated this condition again before the hearing was over. 47 And Aspenwood confirmed
this understanding months later, at a post-trial hearing regarding attorney fees. 48
After the parties stipulated to dismissing Still Standing, the trial opened with
Chuck and Cathy as defendants. With one exception, Chuck and Cathy adhered to the
stipulation. The one exception occurred when Chuck attempted to offer testimony that he
42

See R. at 8383, p. 13:4-11.
R. at 8383, p. 17:10-22.
44 R. at 8383, pp. 18:23-19:3.
45 Id.
46 R. at 8383, p. 18:4-15.
47 R. at 8383, pp. 28:8-29:5.
48 R. at 8390, p. 47:10-21.
43

9

had written "Member" next to his name in the REPC to indicate that he had signed the
REPC in a representative capacity .49
Aspenwood objected to this evidence and the parties conferred with the court to
resolve the objection. 50 The court suggested bringing Still Standing back into the case as
a potentially liable party. 51 Instead of agreeing that Still Standing be brought back into
the case, or asserting that the testimony should be allowed, Chuck's counsel suggested
that the.parties instruct the jury to disregard Chuck's testimony. 52 Aspenwood and the
court agreed to this suggestion, and the jury was informed that it should disregard
Chuck's testimony regarding writing "Member" next to his name in the REPC. 53
At the close of Aspenwood's case in chief, both Chuck and Cathy moved for a
directed verdict. 54 Chuck's motion was denied, but Cathy's was granted and she was
dismissed from the case. 55
At this point, Chuck was in a difficult position. The court had already ruled as a
matter of the law that a commission had been earned. Chuck was now the only remaining
defendant. But Chuck's liability was not a foregone conclusion. 56 To avoid liability,
Chuck attempted to avoid liability by arguing to the jury that the REPC signed by Chuck

49

R.
so R.
51 R.
52 R.
53 R.
54 R.
55 R.
56 R.

at 8385, pp. 13:7-16:22.
at 8385, pp. 24:12-41:18.
at 8385, p. 28:10-14.
at 8385, pp. 30:6-31:10.
at 8385, pp. 40:8--43:1.
at 5317-21; 8385, pp.192:3-193 :21, 207:2-213:20.
at 5423-25; 8385, pp. 205:4-206:25, 218:20-221 :1.
at 8386, p. 85:9-13.
10

was not connected to the FSBO,57 that Chuck did not ratify Cathy's signature on the
FSBO,58 and that no evidence showed that the FSBO had been signed before the REPC
had been signed. 59
After hearing the evidence, the jury sided with Aspenwood, making two critical
factual findings: 1) Chuck had ratified Cathy's signature on the FSBO; and 2) the
evidence showed that Chuck had agreed to be bound by the FSBO. 60 As a result, the jury
determined that Chuck owed a commission to Aspenwood. 61 This determination was
supported by testimony at trial that Chuck told Aspenwood that he would pay the
commission62 and that Aspenwood expected Chuck to pay the commission personally. 63
Chuck responded to the unfavorable verdict by submitting a motion for judgment
vi)

notwithstanding the verdict. 64 This motion was based on several grounds, none of which
asserted that Still Standing should have been found liable rather than Chuck. 65 The court
denied the motion. 66

R. at 8387, pp. 78:24-79:5, 83:11-86:22.
58 R. at 8387, pp. 81:16-82:18, 91:22-92:16 ("Remax has failed to satisfy [its] burden
primarily because Mr. Schvaneveldt never intended to ratify or adopt the - - the
contract").
59 R. at 8387, pp. 87:1-90:17.
60 Ex. A, Addendum.
61 Id.
62 R. at 8385, pp. 104:13-20, 116:23-118:20, 119:13-16, 188:14-24.
63 R. at 8385, pp. 128:16-129:6, 175:18-24.
64 R. at 5393-94.
65 R. at 5395-420.
66 R. at 5615-19.
57

11

.

Ten months after the trial ended, Chuck submitted a motion to dismiss based on
newly discovered evidence concerning a man named Dale Quinlan. 67 In essence, Chuck
claimed that this new evidence showed that Quinlan had originally owned ~e Remax
Elite dba. 68 According to Chuck, this somehow made Quinlan Remax Elite's principal
broker and the only party entitled to seek the FSBO commission. 69
The Dale Quinlan evidence falls into five categories:
•·. --documents suggesting that Quinlan originally owned the Remax Elite-=dba; 70
•

an affidavit from Quinlan stating that he had never transferred his rights to
the FSBO commission to Aspenwood; 71

•

an "Expert Forgery Report" (offered years after the expert discovery
deadline) purporting to establish that a transfer of the Remax Elite dba to
Aspenwood was based on forged signatures;72

•

a document from the State of Utah (obtained ex parte) stating that the
Remax Elite dba had been returned to Quinlan in December of2013;73 and

•

documents suggesting that Quinlan had settled his purported right to the
FSBO commission and had assigned the Remax Elite dba to Still
. 74
Standmg
..

This untimely evidence directly contradicted the evidence that was uncontested at
trial, where Skip Wing testified that he was Remax Elite's principal broker75 and that the
Remax Elite dba belonged to his brokerages (the plaintiffs Aspenwood Real Estate
67

R. at 6864-66.
R. at 6867.
69 R. at 6869-71.
70 R. at 6873-74.
71 R. at 6886-87.
72 R. at 7066-87.
73 R. at 8129.
74 R. at 7051-52; 8124-26; 8138; 8142; 8151-52.
75 R. at 8384, pp. 163:15-17, 183: 12-15.
68
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Corporation and Elite Legacy Corporation). 76 In addition, Tim Shea testified that he
worked for Remax Elite and that Skip Wing was Remax Elite's principal broker. 77

In contrast, no party attempted to introduce evidence at trial showing that
Aspenwood did not own the Remax Elite dba or that the Remax Elite dba was not
properly registered. Indeed, Chuck's own counsel throughout trial constantly referred to
Remax Elite and the named plaintiffs interchangeably, including referring to Skip Wing
as Remax Elite's principal broker. 78 At one point Chuck's counsel even proposed a jury
instruction that referred to Skip Wing as Remax Elite's broker. 79 But Dale Quinlan's
name did not come up at trial. Not once.
Partially because Quinlan did not come up during trial, the trial court absolutely
~

refused to consider the untimely Dale Quinlan evidence: "Raising this question of fact
concerning the standing of the plaintiffs at this late date is unwarranted .... Raising new
factual issues nearly a year after a jury trial and six months after entry of judgment will
not be permitted. " 80
The court used Rules 59 and 60 as guidance, noting that those rules would not

;;p

allow evidence that could have been discovered earlier through due diligence. 81 And here,
the court reasoned, it was beyond belief that Chuck could not have discovered the Dale

76

J

R. at 8384, pp. 164:19-165:21; see also R. at 8384, p. 172:5-12.
77 R. at 8385, pp. 87:15-88:2.
78 E.g., R. at 8384, 149: 24-150:5, 153:5-12, 172:5-7, 174:3-9, 178: 12-13; 8385, pp.
64:16-19, 65:22-66: 1; 8387, pp. 78: 16-79:5, 82: 12-18, 83:2-6, 91 :22-92:4, 92: 14-16.
79 R. at 8384, p. 67:8-19.
80 R. at 7013. Ex. C, Addendum.
s1 Id.
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Quinlan evidence through due diligence. 82 Based on its refusal to consider the new
evidence, the court denied the motion to dismiss. 83
Chuck persisted. Three weeks after filing Chuck's first post-trial motion to
dismiss, Chuck and Still Standing filed a second motion to dismiss based on a purported
settlement agreement. 84 This motion claimed that Dale Quinlan and the defendants had
reached a settlement agreement regarding the FSBO commission. 85
Again, the.trialcourt absolutely refused to consider new evidence: [T]his court- .......
cannot consider new evidence from Defendants after a final judgment ...." 86 The court
stated that the evidence could have been discovered earlier through due diligence, and
that this failure to timely discover and present the evidence was a "fatal flaw" to
considering it. 87
Three weeks after filing the second motion, Chuck submitted a third motion based
on the Dale Quinlan evidence. 88 Chuck asked the court under Rule 52 to amend the
findings in the final judgment, asserting that the judgment should be revised to reflect
that Dale Quinlan owned the Remax Elite dba and was therefore the contracting party in
the FSB0. 89
In response, the trial court refused a third time to consider the Dale Quinlan

Id.
83 R. at 7016.
84 R. at 6987-93.
85 Id.
86 R. at 7147. Ex. D, Addendum.
87 R. at 7148.
88 R. at 7088-90.
89 R. at 7093-104.
82
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evidence: "[T]he Court's ruling is that there is no latitude under Rule 52 to consider new
evidence. " 90
One month after submitting the third motion, Chuck submitted a fourth motion,
this time requestingrelieffromjudgment under Rule 60(b). 91 In this motion, Chuck
asserted that he had exercised due diligence to obtain the Dale Quinlan evidence and that
the Dale Quinlan evidence established that Aspenwood did not have standing. 92
Yet again, the trial court refused to consider the untimely Dale Quinlan evidence:
The Court's observation of this case, from the review of the proceedings up
to the point of trial and then during the post-trial process, is that this issue
of Mr. Quinlan's ownership of the dba, and his derivative right therefore to
effectively control these claims or to transfer them, assign them, or
compromise them, is a construct, all of which has occurred after trial. ...
None of those issues have ever been presented on an evidentiary basis
to the Court, and the Court, in light of both the timing of its presentation,
the fact that Mr. Quinlan's involvement, both in the business entity and in
the registration of the dba, is a matter of public record that has existed for
many years, and questions that the Court has raised with respect to these
documents, the Court will simply not countenance the legal argument that
Mr. Quinlan is effectively the superseding entity with respect to these
claims, and that argument is not given further legal consideration by the
Court. 93
One last attempt was made to introduce the Dale Quinlan evidence, this time by
Still Standing. In this fifth attempt, Still Standing moved the court to substitute Still
Standing as the plaintiff under Rule 25. 94 Still Standing relied on the Dale Quinlan

90

.;;J

R.
R.
92 R.
93 R.
94 R.

91

at 8238. Ex. E, Addendum .
at 7287-94.
at 7311-18.
at 8264-65 (emphasis added). Ex. F, Addendum.
at 8112.
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evidence to suggest that Quinlan had transferred its rights in the case to Still Standing,
and therefore Aspenwood should be replace with the "true claimholder," Still Standing. 95
The trial court refused to depart from its earlier rulings:
Defendants' Rule 25(c) motion raises an issue essentially identical to an
issue that the Defendants have raised previously, i.e. the claim that Still
Standing Stables, as the asserted current owner of the dba "Remax Elite,"
either by assignment from Dale Quinlan or by separate administrative
determination by the Department of Corporations, owns the right to control
the judgment in this case. In past hearings, the court has ruled that the
evidence and arguments supporting these assertions of Still Standing
Stables were not timely brought in this case and are not now pro~erly
before the court. The court declines to modify its earlier rulings. 6
After this motion was resolved, the litigation finally moved on to appellate review.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

In September, 1998, Still Standing bought a property located in Weber County
(the Property) from the Utah School and Institutional Lands Administration (SITLA). 97
SITLA notified Still Standing and Chuck that the Property likely had no public access. 98
Despite the notice from SITLA, Still Standing attempted to establish that the
Property had public access by filing a lawsuit against the property owners whose land
separated the Property from the only nearby public road. 99 The judge in that case found
that the Property had no access, that Still Standing knew there was no access, and that the
claim was frivolous. 100

95

R. at 8112-16.
R. at 8453-54. Ex. G, Addendum.
97 R. at 2900.
98 R. at 2901.

96

99

Gi

Id.

100

R. at 2901-2; Still Standing Stable, L.L.C. v. Allen, 2005 UT 46, 111-5, 122 P.3d 556.
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After that case ended, Still Standing purchased a narrow five-acre strip of land (the
'

Strip) bordering the Property in an attempt to obtain public access. 101 The Strip is on the
Property's south side, while the only nearby public road is north of the Property. 102

In December 2005, Metro Title issued an ALTA Owner's Title Commitment for
the Strip. 103 The Title Commitment refused to insure access to the Strip. 104 In other
words, Chuck knew from the earlier lawsuit that the Property had no public access and
knew through the title policy that the Strip had no public access.
Six weeks later, Chuck entered into a For Sale by Owner Commission
Agreement, 105 in which he agreed to pay a commission equal to 3% of the purchase price
if he accepted an offer to purchase the Property.
~

106

The FSBO listed the Seller as Chuck

and Cathy Code, which the jury reformed to define the Seller as Chuck Schvaneveldt and
Cathy Code. 107 The FSBO does not reference Still Standing in any way or express that
Chuck or Cathy were acting on Still Standing's behalf. 108
About two weeks later, Chuck signed a REPC and accepted an offer to purchase
the Property. 109 The REPC required Chuck to provide a general warranty deed at

101

R. at 2902.
R. at 2902.
103 R. at 2903.
104 R. at 2903.
105 Cathy Code signed the FSBO on Chuck's behalf, and the jury found that Chuck
ratified that signature. Ex. A, Addendum.
106 Ex. 5, Br. of Appellant, ,r 2.
107 Ex. A, Addendum.
108 Ex. 5, Br. of Appellant.
109 Ex. 6, Br. of Appellant, § 25.
102
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closing. 110 The REPC listed Chuck as the Seller, and did not express that Chuck was
acting on behalf of another entity. 111 The REPC described the Property as "Land LLC
Still Standing Stables" but did not indicate that Still Standing was a party to the REPC. 112
The day after Chuck signed the REPC, Metro Title issued an ALTA Owner's Title
Commitment for the Property. 113 This Title Commitment refused to insure access to the
Property. 114
The day after receiving. this title policy, Chuck signed the Seller's Property
Condition Disclosures, in which he represented that there was direct access to the
Property through a private easement. 115 Chuck made this representation despite the
lawsuit establishing that no access existed and two title policies refusing to insure access.
Two months later, Metro Title issued yet another ALTA policy, this one refusing
to insure access to both the Property and the Strip. 116 Despite receiving this ALTA policy,
Chuck did not amend his inaccurate representation in the Seller's Property Condition
Disclosures as he was required to do. 117

Id. § 10.1.
Id. § 25.
112 Id. § l.
I1 3 R. at 2904.
114 Id.
115 R. at 1537.
116 R. at 2904.
117 R. at 1538.
llO
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As the closing date approached, Chuck indicated that he would be providing a
special warranty deed at closing, not a general warranty deed as required by the REPC. 118
The special warranty. deed would not guarantee access to the Property.11 9
At this point, the Buyer had arranged all the necessary financing and was ready to
close the deal. 120 But after learning that Chuck would not fulfill his contractual. obligation
to provide a general warranty deed, the Buyer decided not to go through with the deal. 121
Nevertheless, Chuck attempted to complete the transaction by showing up at closing and
signing the closing documents. 122
During this process, the real estate agent brokering the deal was Tim Shea. 123 Tim
Shea worked for Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation, which was doing business as
l.4ii)

Remax Elite, with Skip Wing as the principal broker. 124 Aspenwood Real Estate later
became Elite Legacy Corporation, which also did business as Remax Elite with Skip
Wing as the principal broker. 125 Skip has since retired, 126 while Tim has moved to
Colorado. 127 Both Aspenwood Real Estate and Elite Legacy have ceased operating and
will conclude their winding up phase as soon as this litigation ends. 128

118

R. at 2913-15; 8385, pp. 135:17-136:19, 187:17-188:3.
R. at 2913-15.
120 R. at 8385, pp. 135:17-136:19.
121 Id.
122 R. at 367.
123 E.g., R. at 8385, pp. 128:16-129:6, 175:18-24.
124 R. at 8384, pp. 163:15-17, 164:19-165:21, 183: 12-15; 8385, pp. 87:15-88:2.
125 R. at 8384, pp. 164: 19-165:26.
126 R. at 8384, p. 164:13-18.
127 R. at 8385, p. 86:12-13.
128 See R. at 1092; 1483-85.
119
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I.

Aspenwood has standing.

At this stage of litigation, Chuck may establish that Aspenwood does not have
standing only ifno evidence exists to support Aspenwood's standing. Evidence was
introduced at trial showing that Skip Wing was the proper principal broker to bring the
claim and that the plaintiffs were properly operating under the Remax Elite dba. No
conflicting evidence was offered until,,nearly a year after trial, and the trial court deemed
the evidence untimely and refused to consider it. As a result, substantial evidence
establishes that Aspenwood has standing, no conflicting evidence exists, and therefore
Chuck's standing argument fails.

Il.

A commission was earned as a matter of law.

The FSBO provides that Aspenwood earned a commission if the Seller accepted
an offer to purchase the Seller's property. It is undisputed that the Seller accepted an offer
to purchase the Seller's property. Therefore Aspenwood earned a commission. This is
true even though even though the sale never went through and the FSBO states that the
commission will be paid at closing from proceeds of the sale. Utah courts have held that
such provisions do not affect a promise to pay a commission, even if the deal does not
materialize. In any event, the sale failed due to the Seller's failure to provide a general
warranty deed, as required by the REPC.

III.

Chuck is personally liable.

Chuck waived the argument that Still Standing is liable for the commission by not
objecting when Still Standing was dismissed, by stipulating that he would not make this
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argument, and by failing to raise the argument at trial.
In addition, the jury verdict finding Chuck liable may be overturned only if no
evidence exists to support it. Evidence was introduced at trial that Chuck told Aspenwood
he would pay the commission and that Aspenwood expected Chuck to pay the
commission personally. In addition, the FSBO and the REPC list Chuck as the Seller, but
do not name Still Standing or express that Chuck was acting on behalf of Still Standing.
As a result, substantial evidence exists to support the jury verdict and therefore the
verdict may not be disturbed.
ARGUMENT

I.

Aspenwood has standing to maintain this action.
As a preliminary matter, it is unclear whether Chuck is appealing a specific

standing ruling or simply raising the issue on appeal independent of any trial court ruling.
Aspenwood assumes that Chuck is appealing one of the five post-trial rulings regarding
standing because Chuck's argument relies upon evidence that was offered, but not
considered, nearly a year after trial.

A. Chuck's standing argument may prevail only ifno evidence supports the
Plaintiffs' claim to standing.
The Utah Supreme Court declared in 2010 that challenges to standing must be
,.i;

evaluated using the standard for a dispositive motion at the relevant stage of litigation. 129
At this stage of litigation (i.e., after a jury trial has been held, a verdict returned, and a
final judgment entered), the appropriate dispositive motion is a motion for judgment

129

Brown v. Div. of Water Rights, 2010 UT 14, ,i 15,228 P.3d 747.
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notwithstanding the verdict. 130 Therefore Chuck's challenge to Aspenwood's standing
r:·,

must be evaluated under the standard for a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. 131
A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be granted only if no
substantial evidence supports the verdict and the losing party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law .132 All evidence and reasonable inferences that support the verdict must be
accepted as true, while conflicting evidence, must be disregarded. 133 In addition, the
evidence must be taken as it existed at the close of trial, 134 and appellate courts give
deference to factual determinations that affect standing. 135

In this case, the standing argument fails because substantial evidence was
introduced at trial showing that Aspenwood has standing. The witnesses Skip Wing and
Tim Shea both testified that Skip was Remax Elite's principal broker, thus satisfying the
requirement in Utah Code§ 61-2f-305 that the principal broker bring the lawsuit. 136 And
while no testimony was offered to show the registration required by § 42-2-6.6, this
registration can be reasonably inferred from Skip's testimony that Aspenwood owned the

130

Utah R. Civ. P. 50(b); see also Koer v. Mayfair Mkts., 431 P.2d 566, 568-69 (Utah
1967).
131 Brown v. Div. of Water Rights, 2010 UT 14, ,i 15.
132 Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988); Koer v. Mayfair Mkts., 431 P.2d at
568-69.
133 Koerv. Mayfair Mkts., 431 P.2d at 568-69.
134 Franklin v. Stevenson, 1999 UT 61, ,i 7, 987 P.2d 22 ("[T]he evidence must be taken
as it existed at the close of the trial .... ") (quoting Townsend v. United States Rubber
Co., 392 P.2d 404 (N.M. 1964)).
135 Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, ,i 10, 154 P.3d 808 (internal citations omitted).
136 R. at 8384, pp. 163:15-17, 183: 12-15; 8385, pp. 87:15-88:2.
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Remax Elite dba and was operating as Remruc Elite. 137 Chuck's own counsel referred to
Aspenwood throughout trial as Remruc Elite and stated that Skip Wing was Remax Elite's
principal broker. 138 In contrast, no evidence was offered at trial to suggest that
Aspenwood did not own or had not properly registered the Remax Elite dba.
Indeed, Chuck did not even attempt at trial to offer evidence showing that Skip
Wing was not Remruc Elite's principal broker, that the Remruc Elite dba was not properly
· registered, or that some other party was the true owner of the Remruc Elite dba. 139
Nothing was preventing Chuck from introducing this evidence. Chuck simply abandoned
his standing argument once the current plaintiffs were added to the case.
As a result, where all trial evidence supports the conclusion that Aspenwood has
~

standing and no contrary evidence was offered, Chuck's standing argument fails. This is
true despite Chuck's efforts to introduce "newly discovered" evidence nearly a year after
trial.
B. The trial court deemed untimely and did not consider evidence on standing
offered for tlie first time nearly a year after trial.
Standing is a jurisdictional matter that can be raised at any time, including after
trial or on appeal. 140 But evidence supporting a standing argument may be excluded as

R. at 8384, pp. 164:19-165:21. Pretrial evidence also showed thatAspenwood had
f[soperly registered the Re~ax Elite ~ba. R._at 2167-6~
.
.
.
E.g., R. at 8384, pp. 149. 24-150.5, 153.5-12, 172.5-7, 174.3-9, 178. 12-13, 8385,
pp. 64:16-19, 65:22-66:1; 8387, pp. 78:16-79:5, 82:12-18, 83:2-6, 91:22-92:4, 92:1416.
139 See pp. 12-13, supra.
140 Sonntag v. Ward, 2011 UT App 122, ,r 2,253 P.3d 1120.
137

.;;
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untimely. 141 And evidence that the trial court did not consider cannot be considered on
appeal. 142 In this case, Chuck's standing argument relies entirely on evidence that the trial
court deemed untimely and refused to consider. Thus, while standing is an argument that
cannot be waived, Chuck in effect waived his Quinlan argument by failing to timely offer
supporting evidence.
The Dale Quinlan issue first surfaced nearly a year after trial, when Chuck began
attempting to introduce evidence related to Quinlan's purported ownership ofRemax
Elite. This Dale Quinlan evidence purported to establish that Quinlan, not Aspenwood,
was the true owner of the Remax Elite dba (and therefore Quinlan was somehow the true
party entitled to the commission).
Chuck and Still Standing clearly realized that the Dale Quinlan evidence was
crucial to their standing argument-in total, Chuck, Still Standing, or both together
submitted five post-trial motions asking the court to consider the Dale Quinlan evidence.
In each instance, the trial court absolutely refused to consider the Dale Quinlan
evidence. 143 In doing so, the court emphasized that this evidence could have been
discovered with due diligence-ostensibly the very day the lawsuit was filed. The court
also noted that it was simply improper to raise factual issues for the first time nearly a
See Cabaness v. Thomas, 2010 UT 23, ,i,i 49-51, 232 P.3d 486 (explaining that trial
courts have broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence, including evidence the court
deems untimely) (internal citations omitted).
142 Pilcher v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 663 P.2d 450,453 (Utah 1983) ("Matters not admitted
in evidence before the trier of fact will not be considered here.") (citing Corbet v. Corbet,
472 P.2d 430,433 (1970) ("On Appeal to this court we review the judgments and orders
appealed from on the basis of the record upon which the trial court acted, and do not
p,ermit the supplementing of our record with matters not before the trial court.")).
43 See pp. 12-16, supra.
141
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year after trial.

In the end, despite Chuck's tenacity, the court never considered any evidence that
would contradict the facts established at trial: Skip Wing was Remax Elite's principal
broker and was entitled to seek a commission. This is a fatal flaw in Chuck's argument.
The Dale Quinlan evidence-which Chuck's standing argument depends upon-may not
be considered on appeal. Without any supporting evidence, Chuck's standing argument
necessarily fails.
C.

Even if the untimely evidence is considered, Chuck's argument/ails as a
matter of law.
Chuck asserts that the assumed-name statute prevents Aspenwood from

maintaining this lawsuit because the Remax Elite dba either has expired or belongs to
Still Standing. 144 Even if Chuck has not waived this argument and some evidence exists
that Aspenwood did not properly register the dba, Chuck's standing argument still fails,
.,;)

for three reasons: First, the assumed-name statute does not bar Aspenwood from
maintaining this action. Second, any failure to properly register the dba can still be cured.
Third, public policy does not allow cases to be dismissed based on evidence offered
nearly a year after trial.
1. The assumed-name statute does not prevent Aspenwood from maintaining

this lawsuit.
The assumed-name statute requires a party conducting business under an assumed
name to properly register that name before the party may maintain judicial

144

Br. of Appellant, pp. 38--40; Utah Code Ann. § 42-2-10 (2015).
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proceedings. 145 This statute does not apply to Aspenwood because Aspenwood is not
conducting business under an assumed name.
Clearly Aspenwood conducted business in the past under the assumed name
Remax Elite. This was established by testimony at trial. But the Aspenwood plaintiffs no
longer conduct any business at all: Skip Wing is retired and Aspenwood and Elite Legacy
ceased operating years ago. 146 Where the assumed-name statute applies only to parties
actively conducting business, and where the Aspenwood. plaintiffs no longer conduct
business, the assumed-name statute does not apply to the Aspenwood plaintiffs.
More importantly, the pretrial and trial evidence supports the conclusion that
Aspenwood properly maintained its dba during all times that Aspenwood was conducting
business under the name Remax Elite. 147 This includes proper registration at the time this
lawsuit was initiated. 148 But once Aspenwood ceased conducting business as Remax
Elite, the assumed-name statute no longer required Aspenwood to properly register the
Remax Elite dba.
This analysis comports with the purpose of the assumed-name statute: to notify the
public who owns the business and protect those who transact business with the
underlying owner. 149 The Remax Elite dba was properly registered during all times that
Aspenwood was conducting business, and therefore all parties conducting business with

Utah Code Ann.§ 42-2-10 (2015).
R. at 1092; 1483-85; 2153; 8384, p. 164:13-18.
147 R. at 2167-68; 8384, pp. 163:15-17, 164:19-165:21, 183: 12-15; 8385, pp. 87:1588:2.
148 See R. at 2167-68.
149 Putnam v. lndust. Comm'n, 14 P.2d 973 (Utah 1932).
145

146
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Aspenwood-including Chuck-had notice concerning the use of the assumed name.
Once Aspenwood shut down, there was no longer a need to protect persons transacting
business with Aspenwood (since no business was being transacted at all), and thus no
longer a need to register the Remax Elite dba.
In addition, the statute requires only that "the provisions of [the assumed-name]
chapter are complied with" before a party may maintain a lawsuit. 150 If the Dale Quinlan
evidence is· accepted as true, that evidence would_ establish that the provisions of the
chapter have been complied with (i.e., the Remax Elite dba is registered and active). And
if the provisions of the assumed-name chapter are complied with, the statute is satisfied
and allows Aspenwood to maintain its case.

2. Any failure to comply with the assumed-name statute may be cured.
Still Standing's registration of the Remax Elite dba is a highly questionable
litigation tactic: it appears that Still Standing registered the Remax Elite dba for the sole
purpose of preventing Aspenwood from registering the dba and to avoid resolving this
case on the merits. This Court should disregard evidence of registration for that reason
.,i}

alone. 151
But even if this Court considers the untimely Quinlan evidence and determines
that Still Standing owns the Remax Elite dba, Aspenwood can still cure this defect by
recovering and properly registering the Remax Elite dba. The recovery process would

.;,;

150

Utah Code Ann. § 42-2-10 (2015).
See Salcedo v. Asociacion Cubana, Inc., 368 So. 2d 1337, 1339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979) ("(C]ourts will not allow the practice of the ... 'gotcha!' school oflitigation to
succeed.").
151
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require time and possibly another round of litigation (the last thing this lawsuit needs).
But Still Standing's claim to the Remax Elite dba would not withstand judicial scrutiny,
for two reasons: 1) Still Standing's registration ofRemax Elite violates the assumedname statute; and 2) even if Quinlan owned the Remax Elite dba, Quinlan had no right to
transfer it to Still Standing.
The Utah Code does not allow Still Standing to register the Remax Elite dba if the
Q
,., ... ,

"':•

••k

dba is misleading regarding Still Standing's business purpose. 152 And the name Remax
Elite applied to Still Standing is certainly misleading. The name Remax Elite implies that
the underlying entity is a real estate brokerage and a Remax International franchisee. Still
Standing is obviously not a real estate brokerage and no evidence exists to show that Still
Standing is a Remax International franchisee. As a result, Still Standing's use of the
Remax Elite dba is misleading and§ 42-2-6.6(l)(a) prevents Still Standing from
maintaining that dba.
In addition, Dale Quinlan had no right to assign the Remax Elite dba to Still
Standing. It is common knowledge that franchisors such as Remax International keep
close tabs on their franchisees to ensure that the franchisor's brand is protected. They do
not allow franchisees unilaterally to assign franchise agreements or the rights to the
franchisor's name. 153 Yet this is what Still Standing claims has happened, i.e., that Dale

152

See Utah Code Ann. § 42-2-6.6(l)(a) (2015).
Evidence to this effect was submitted in a separate case filed by Still Standing
regarding ownership of the Remax Elite dba (Second District, Case No. 130701109). Out
of respect for the Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure, Aspenwood will not attempt to
introduce that evidence for the first time on appeal, even though doing so would seem a
fair response to Chuck's reliance on the untimely Quinlan evidence. But if this Court is
153
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Quinlan sold the right to use the Remax Elite name to Still Standing without any
authorization from Remax International.
In short, Still Standing claims that it owns the Remax Elite dba, but that claim has
never been tested. If Aspenwood is forced to use the judicial system to reclaim and reregister the Remax Elite dba, it can and will do so. Thus, even if the assumed-name
statute currently prevents Aspenwood from maintaining this lawsuit, Aspenwood can
cure this defect,-·making Chuck's argument moot.

3. Public policy does not allow final judgments to be reversed based on
untimely evidence.
As a public policy matter, Chuck's standing argument should not be considered.
Dismissing a case based on evidence that was readily available but not offered until
nearly a year after trial sets horrible precedent. Such precedent would disregard the
fundamental protections afforded by the judicial process, including the opportunity to
.-i)

request documents from opposing parties and to depose adverse witnesses.
Here, Aspenwood has not had these vital protections: Aspenwood had no
opportunity to cross-examine Dale Quinlan, to depose him, to compel his appearance as a
witness, or to subpoena documents from him or from the State of Utah that might
undermine Chuck's new evidence. Quinlan has never appeared in any proceeding in this
case, before, during, or after trial. Aspenwood's lack of opportunity to contest the
Quinlan evidence is prejudicial because the Quinlan evidence leaves critical questions
unanswered:
inclined to take judicial notice of that case and the evidence showing that Quinlan had no
right to own or transfer "Remax Elite," Aspenwood encourages the Court to do so.
29

•

Does the Department of Corporations have authority to unilaterally
reassign ownership of a dba? No rules or regulations were ever cited to the
court suggesting that the Department of Corporations has this authority.

•

Who requested the reassignment?

•

What was the basis for the decision to reassign?

•

Did the Department of Corporations give notice to potentially affected
parties?

•

Did affected parties, including Aspenwood, have an opportunity to be
heard?

•

Who made the final decision to reassign the dba, and was that person a
fair, neutral decision maker?

The Quinlan evidence does not answer these questions. As a result, dismissing this case
relying upon the incomplete Quinlan evidence amounts to a violation of Aspenwood's
due process rights.
In addition, allowing untimely evidence concerning standing renders "final
judgments" forever unstable. If litigants can dismiss already-decided cases based on
newly discovered standing evidence, virtually every case ever decided remains up in the
air. Surely the judicial system does not allow such a result. Litigation must end sometime,
and final judgments should be just that-final.

II.

The trial court ruled correctly that a commission bad been earned.

A. Chuck became obligated to pay a commission the moment he accepted an offer
to purchase the Property.
Chuck is bound under the plain language of the FSBO to pay a commission.

If the language within the four corners of a contract is unambiguous, a court may
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determine the parties' intent from that language as a matter of law. 154 In this case, the
FSBO's language regarding Chuck's obligation to pay a commission is unambiguous:
The Seller agrees to pay the Company, irrespective of agency
relationship(s), as compensation for services, a Brokerage Fee in the
amount of$_ _ _ _ _ _ or 3 % of the acquisition price of the Property,
if the Seller accepts an offer from Emmett Warren and or Assigns (the
"Buyer"), or anyone acting on the Buyer's behalf, to purchase or exchange
the Property. 155
The plain language in this provision has only one condition, one "if': Chuck must
accept an offer from the Buyer. If that one condition was satisfied, then Chuck became
vP

obligated to pay the commission. The analysis ends there.
And Chuck clearly accepted an offer from the Buyer. The relevant facts in this
case are quite simple: On approximately January 20, 2006, the parties entered into the
FSBO, which contains the commission provision. Two weeks later, the Buyer sent Chuck
a signed REPC offering to purchase the Property for $4,362,500. The next day, Chuck

-i>

signed the REPC and accepted the Buyer's offer. Chuck even attempted to go through
with the deal by showing up at closing and signing the closing documents. By signing the
REPC and accepting the Buyer's offer, Chuck triggered his obligation to pay a
commission. This is true even though the sale of the Property did not materialize.

B. The broker's commission did not depend on the Buyer's or Seller's subsequent
performance.
Chuck contends that he agreed to pay a commission only if the deal closed. 156 To

154

Fairbourn Commercial, Inc. v. Am. Hous. Partners, Inc., 2003 UT App 98, 115, 68
P.3d 1038 (internal citation omitted).
155 Ex. 5, Br. of Appellant, 12.
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support his position, Chuck relies on this provision in the FSBO: "The Seller agrees that
the Brokerage Fee shall be due and payable, from the proceeds of the Seller, on the date
of recording of closing documents for the purchase or exchange of the Property by the
Buyer or anyone acting on the Buyer's behalf." 157
According to Chuck, this provision means that the parties agreed that the
commission would be paid at closing from the proceeds of the sale. Thus if there were no
· . closing and no proceeds then no payment could be due and payable. Chuck should not be
allowed to make this argument on appeal because he did not raise this argument when
opposing summary judgment and therefore failed to preserve it. 158 But in any event,
under Utah law as expressed in Fairbourn Commercial Inc. v. Am. Hous. Partners, 159 this
FSBO provision does not affect Chuck's obligation to pay a commission.

1. A broker is not an insurer of the Buyer's or the Seller's subsequent
performance.
In Fairbourn, a seller agreed to pay a commission to a broker if the broker
presented an offer from a buyer and the seller accepted the offer. 160 Pursuant to this
agreement the broker presented an offer from a buyer and the seller accepted the offer. 161
Even though the seller accepted the offer, the closing never occurred; the seller sold the
property to a new buyer and then refused to pay the original broker a commission for the

Id., p. 43.
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160 Id.~ 16.
161 Id. ~~ 7-9, 17.
1s1

158

32

failed deal. 162 The broker sued, claiming that a commission was due under the
agreement-even though the deal failed-because the broker had presented an offer and
the seller had accepted the offer. 163
The seller responded that the agreement to pay a commission was contingent on
the parties going through with the deal. 164 The seller relied on a phrase in the agreement
that the commission would become "due and payable at closing." 165 Because no closing
occurred, the seller argued, the commission was not due and payable but was contingent
on a closing actually occurring. 166
The seller's argument was rejected by the trial court, 167 the Utah Court of
Appeals, 168 and the Utah Supreme Court. 169 The Utah Court of Appeals adopted the
JI

majority rule that the phrase "at closing" by itself does not require that a closing actually
occur. 170
The Court of Appeals explained that this rule accords with the general rule in Utah
that a broker is entitled to a commission even if a deal does not go through-the broker is
not an insurer of subsequent performance by the buyer or the seller. 171
In addition, the Court of Appeals explained that an exception to the general rule
162 Id.
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arises only where a contract expressly states that a commission is contingent on a
closing. 172 As support, the Court of Appeals quoted a New Jersey case stating that such a
provision must clearly indicate the condition: "In order to absolve a party from the
payment of commissions, it must clearly appear by the contract with his broker that the
payment of commissions was made contingent upon the actual transfer of title. " 173 If such
a provision does not exist, the Court of Appeals stated that courts may not imply one. 174
.. Under this legal framework, the Court of Appeals held that the phrase 5'due and
payable at closing" does not make the payment of a commission contingent on a
closing. 175 The Court of Appeals explained that in Fairbourn the duty to pay a
commission had only one condition precedent: the seller must accept an offer presented
by the broker. 176 In contrast, the term "due and payable at closing" was merely a timing
clause-it did not have any language creating a condition. 177 The Court of Appeals
reasoned that if the parties intended the commission to be contingent on closing, the
parties would have included conditional language such as "only," "unless," "until," or
"if."178

The Utah Supreme Court agreed with this analysis and held that the due and

See id. ,r,r 21-22.
Id. ,r 21 (quoting Samuel R. Laden, Inc. v. Lidgerwood Estates, Inc., 15 N.J. Misc 498,
192 A. 425, 428 (N.J. 1937)).
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payable clause was merely a timing clause. 179

In addition, the Court explained that if the agreement were interpreted to condition
payment of a commission on a closing, then the provision for earning the commission
would become meaningless. 180 The seller had agreed-without any other conditions-to
pay a commission if the seller accepted an offer presented by the broker. 181 That promise
would have no meaning if the due and payable clause controlled the earning of the
commission. 182 Where the law governing contract interpretation requires courts to give
effect to each contractual provision, the only available conclusion was that the due and
payable clause dealt with timing, not whether a commission had been earned. 183

2. Chuck's promise to pay was not contingent on closing.
The agreement here is like the agreement in Fairbourn. Like the commission
provision in Fairbourn, the FSBO's commission provision has only one condition: Chuck
must accept an offer from the Buyer. This provision, like the provision in Fairbourn,
does not require that a closing occur. Quite simply, the commission was earned once the
Seller accepted the offer.
The trial court agreed, and its oral ruling reflected this straight-forward
interpretation of the FSBO's plain language:
The FSBO contract provided that ... and I'm quoting, if the seller accepts
an offer from Emmett Warren and or assigns or anyone ... acting on the
buyer's behalf to purchase ... or exchange the property, end of quote. It is
179
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undisputed that the seller did accept an offer from Emmett Warr"en LC;
~
. . 184
there1ore,
Remax earne d th e three percent comm1ss1on.
The court's written ruling was just as simple: "Because Plaintiffs provided an offer from
Emmett Warren, L.C., that was accepted by the Seller, ·Plaintiffs have earned the 3%
commission as set forth in the FSBO." 185
This is the correct result even though the FSBO's due and payable clause is
slightly different from the due and payable clause in Fairbourn. In Fairbourn the
commission was due and payable "at closing," while the commission here is due "on the
date of recording of closing documents ...." There is no meaningful difference here. The
FSBO clause, like the clause in Fairbourn, concerns timing-it does not address whether
a commission has been earned. And like the clause in Fairbourn, the FSBO due and
payable clause contains no conditional language such as "only," "unless," ''until," or "if."
If the parties intended the commission to be conditioned on closing, the parties would
have included such language.
The same reasoning applies to the FSBO's statement that the commission would
be due and payable "from the proceeds of the sale." There is no conditional language
here, which the parties would have included if they intended the commission to be
conditioned on the existence of proceeds. The phrase simply does not address whether a
commission has been earned. At best, the phrase implies a condition. But Utah law
refuses to imply such conditions-the agreement must clearly indicate that a commission

184
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is contingent on the completion of the sale. 186 A phrase without conditional language
cannot clearly indicate a condition.
In addition, to find an implied condition in the due and payable clause would
render the provision for earning a commission meaningless. Like the agreement in
Fairbourn, the court must interpret the FSBO to give effect to each contractual provision.
Here, Chuck agreed-without any other conditions-to pay a commission ifhe accepted
an offer from the Buyer. But Chuck's promise to pay a commission would have no
meaning if the due and payable clause controlled the earning of a commission. Ignoring
the FSBO's provision for earning the commission violates Utah law that each contractual
provision must be given effect.
A deal is a deal. Chuck promised to pay a commission ifhe accepted an offer from
the Buyer. When or how that money would be paid does not affect Chuck's promise.

C No dispute exists regarding whether Chuck accepted an offer.
Chuck asserts that he did not truly accept the Buyer's offer because he believed
that the transaction would be a cash transaction. 187 This assertion ignores two important
points: I) the REPC conclusively establishes that the parties agreed that the purchase
price would be financed; and 2) whether the Buyer used cash or financing would not
affect Chuck in any way.
1. The REPC clearly and conclusively indicates a financed transaction.

Section 2 of the REPC deals with the purchase price for the Property and indicates

186
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where the money for the purchase price would come from. The REPC provides five
possible funding options, with a space next to each for indicating the amount to be paid
using that option. The options include an earnest-money option (Section 2.a), a loan
option (Section 2.b), and a cash option (Section 2.e).
The parties entered $25,000 next to the earnest-money option. They also put an

"X" next to the loan option, indicating that the remainder of the purchase price would be
financed through a conventional loan. The parties did nothing to indicate in Section 2.e -. that the purchase price would be paid using cash.
If Chuck expected a cash buyer, he would have indicated that in Section 2.e of the
REPC. This is not a case where Chuck was blindsided by contractual provisions he did
not understand. Chuck is an experienced businessman and he reviewed the REPC with
counsel before signing it. 188 If Chuck believed he would be paid in cash, he should have
followed up with Shea, submitted a counteroffer, or taken any step other than signing the
REPC. And Chuck cannot insist on a cash buyer now-the REPC integrated all previous
discussions and agreements between the parties. 189 Prior discussions about a cash
transaction, if any, did not affect the parties' final written agreement stating that the
Buyer would obtain a loan to purchase the Property.

2. Chuck is not affected by the Buyer's source of funds.

In any event, Chuck has not provided any meaningful explanation for why he
would accept a cash transaction but not a financed transaction. Unless Chuck was

188
189

R. at 8385, pp. 48:17-49:1,
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expecting a suitcase with four and a half million dollars inside, he was going to receive a
check.from someone. 190 \Vhether that check came from the Buyer or a bank or some
other entity does not affect Chuck's bottom line. But in the end, even if cash was
preferable to financing, Chuck cannot complain because it was Chuck's conduct that
caused the deal to fail.
D. Chuck's defa ult caused the transaction to fail
Even accepting Chuck's assertion that he was required to pay a commission only
if the deal went through, Chuck still owes a commission because his default killed the
deal. Chuck's attempt to sell the Property failed for one reason: Chuck did not comply
with his obligation under the REPC to deliver a general warranty deed. Thus Chuck is the
~

defaulting party and unquestionably owes a commission.
When Chuck signed the REPC, he promised that he would deliver a general
warranty deed: "Seller ... will convey good and marketable title to Buyer at Closing by

general warranty deed. " 191 Nevertheless, as the closing date approached, Chuck informed
the Buyer that Chuck was not willing to provide a general warranty deed, but instead
would provide only a special warranty deed. 192
The Buyer understandably insisted that Chuck comply with the REPC and supply
a general warranty deed. 193 But Chuck, knowing that the Property had no legal access,

190

Even if Chuck did demand a suitcase full of cash, the Buyer's lender probably could
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refused. That killed the deal. 194
Chuck disagrees, and contends that he could not be held responsible for the deal's
collapse. According to Chuck, the trial court ruled that the deal failed solely because
Chuck could not guarantee access, while also ruling that the Buyer had waived objections
based on access. 195

In other words, Chuck claims that the Buyer was obligated to go through with the
deal even without insurable access, the Buyer failed to do so, and therefore the Buyer
caused the transaction to fail. But Chuck's explanation of why the deal failed is
incomplete. Aspenwood argued from the beginning, and the trial court agreed, that the
deal failed because the lack of insurable access prevented Chuck from providing a
general warranty deed. 196
In sum, a buyer who bargained for a general warranty deed is not obligated to
accept a special warranty deed. The Buyer never waived this requirement. The trial court
ruled that Chuck's refusal to provide a general warranty deed killed the deal. Thus Chuck
is the defaulting party and unquestionably liable for paying a commission.

E. The Buyer was ready, willing, and able to purchase the Property.
Both parties agree that the general rule in Utah is that a broker earns a commission
by bringing a ready, willing, and able buyer to the table. Both parties also agree that the
general rule may be avoided by agreement, and that the general rule was avoided in this
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case. 197 The FSBO, like the agreement in Fairbourn, avoids the general rule because it
does not address the Buyer's ability to buy the Property. The FSBO thus renders the
Buyer's ability to pay unnecessary for Aspenwood to earn a commission, and the ready,
willing, and able rule does not apply. The only relevant facts concern whether Chuck
accepted an offer.
Even if the ready, willing, and able standard applies, there is no dispute that the
Buyer was ready, willing, and able to purchase the Property. Testimony was introduced
both before and during trial that the Buyer had its financing in place and would have gone
through with this deal if Chuck had provided a general warranty deed. 198 He did not
provide a general warranty deed, and as a result the deal did not close.
~

III.

Chuck is personally liable to pay the commission.
As a preliminary matter, it is unclear which rulings Chuck is appealing in Section

III of his brief. Based on Chuck's Issue Statement, he appears to challenge two rulings: 1)
the denial of Chuck's motion for summary judgment; and 2) a "ruling as a matter of law
that [Chuck] signed the REPC in his individual capacity ...." 199 Chuck's Addendum
contains no ruling on either issue.

A. The trial court did not err in denying Chuck's summary judgment motion where
the contracts refer to Chuck personally and do not express that he is acting as a
representative.
Concerning the first asserted error, it appears that Chuck is appealing the trial
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court's order dated August 13, 2010. 200 The trial court correctly denied Chuck's motion
for summary judgment if Aspenwood demonstrated even a single issue of material fact
that would prevent judgment as a matter oflaw. 201
To demonstrate an issue of material fact preventing judgment as a matter of law,.
Aspenwood relied on the plain language of the relevant contracts. Aspenwood pointed
out the undisputed facts that the FSBO defines Chuck as the Seller, that both the FSBO
and the REPC refer to Chuck:personally, and that neither the FSBO nor the REPC
express that Chuck is acting in a representative capacity. 202 The trial court held that these
facts were sufficient to overcome Chuck's motion for summary judgment. 203
The trial court's ruling was correct. In Utah, agents may avoid personal liability
only if they both name their principal and express that they are acting in a representative
capacity .204 The FSBO and the REPC refer to Chuck individually. They do not refer to
Still Standing and do not indicate that Chuck was acting in a representative capacity. This
evidence-at a minimum-creates a disputed factual issue preventing summary judgment
in Chuck's favor. Indeed, this evidence is likely sufficient to sustain a summary judgment
motion against Chuck. Thus the trial court did not err in denying Chuck's summary
judgment motion.

R. at 1890.
201 Utah R. Civ. P. 56(b);Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36,123, 116 P.3d 323.
202 R. at 14 79-83.
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204 See pp. 48-50, infra.
200

42

B. Chuck cannot argue for Still Standing's liability on appeal because Chuck did
not raise that argument at trial.
Chuck cannot assert on appeal that the evidence shows that Still Standing, not
Chuck, is liable to pay the commission. Chuck waived this argument by not raising it at
trial.
To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must specifically raise the issue and
provide supporting legal authority and analysis such that the trial court has an opportunity
to rule on the issue. 205 Issues that are not raised at trial are usually deemed waived. 206
In this case, Chuck had ample opportunity to argue at trial that Still Standing,
rather than himself, should be liable for the commission. But Chuck did not make that
argument:

205
206

•

Chuck did not object when Still Standing was dismissed from the case. 207

•

Chuck did not object to the jury instruction limiting liability to himself and
Cathy.2os

•

Chuck did not argue at trial that that Still Standing was the party truly liable for
the commission. 209

•

Chuck never requested a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict
asserting that Still Standing was the party truly liable for the commission.

438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ,I 51, 99 P.3d 801.
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209 While Chuck did testify at trial that he had written "Member" next to his name on the
REPC, this evidence was excluded. Ifthere was any error in excluding this testimony, it
was invited by Chuck's counsel, who suggested that the jury be instructed to disregard
Chuck's testimony. See pp. 9-10, supra. Therefore it cannot be the basis for an appeal.
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The closest Chuck came at trial to arguing for Still Standing's liability was a request for a
jury instruction. The requested instruction stated that Chuck and Cathy could not be liable

because the members of Still Standing had not authorized the sale of the Property. 210
In sum, Chuck never argued at trial or in post-trial motions that Still Standing
should be liable for a commission rather than himself. In fact, Chuck invited his personal
liability by failing to fight the dismissal of Still Standing and by not raising Still
Standing's liability at trial. As a result, Chuck's argument regarding the liability of Still
Standing has been waived. And even if Chuck had not waived this argument, he still
loses on appeal because substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that Chuck
personally agreed to be bound by the FSBO.
C. The jury-not the trial court-determined that Chuck was personally liable.

Chuck asserts in his Issue Statement that the trial court ruled as a matter of law
that Chuck signed the REPC in his individual capacity. 211 In his Argument section,
Chuck asserts that the trial court ruled as a matter of law that any liability of Chuck was
in his individual capacity. 212 Both statements are inaccurate. The trial court never ruled as
a matter oflaw that Chuck was personally liable. Instead, three events led to Chuck's
personal liability:
•

Just before trial, Chuck and Cathy stipulated to dismissing Still Standing from the
case on the condition that liability would be determined between Chuck and Cathy .
and that Chuck and Cathy could not argue at trial or later that Still Standing was
liable.

R. at 5209-10.
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•

At the close of Plaintiffs' case in chief, Cathy moved for a directed verdict and
was released from the case.

•

After Chuck concluded his defense, the jury found that Chuck agreed to be bound
by the FSBO and that Chuck owed the commission. 213
Admittedly, this course of events left Chuck in a difficult position. The trial court

had already ruled as a matter of law that someone had to pay a commission. By the time
trial ended, Chuck was the only remaining defendant. But this course of events does not
equal a ruling as a matter of law that Chuck is personally liable.

In the end, it was the jury that found that Chuck agreed to be bound by the FSBO.
Indeed, at trial Chuck's counsel tenaciously attempted to establish that the REPC signed
by Chuck was not connected with the FSBO, that Chuck did not ratify Cathy's signature
on the FSBO, and that the FSBO had been signed after Chuck signed the REPC. 214 After
hearing the evidence, the jury could have agreed with Chuck and Chuck would not have
·;JJ

been required to pay the commission. But the jury sided with Aspenwood, finding that
the evidence showed that Chuck had agreed to be bound by the FSBO.
Whether Chuck's personal liability resulted from a legal ruling or from the jury is
important: a ruling as a matter of law receives no deference on appeal, while a jury
verdict-the event that actually established Chuck's personal liability-will be sustained
so long as some evidence and reasonable inferences support that verdict. 215
In this case, substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that Chuck agreed to
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be bound by the FSBO.216 Tim Shea testified multiple times at trial that Chuck agreed to
pay the commission personally and that Tim expected Chuck to pay the commission. And
the FSBO and the REPC both list Chuck individually without naming Still Standing or
stating that Chuck was acting on Still Standing's behalf. This evidence clearly supports
the verdict and therefore the verdict may not be disturbed on appeal.

D. Even if there was a ruling as a matter of law that Chuck was personally liable,
that ruling would have been correct.
Chuck is personally liable because he was bound by the FSBO and the REPC in
his individual capacity.
The test to determine whether a party signs a contract individually or as an agent is
simple. To avoid personal liability under a contract, an agent must show two things: 1)
the contract names the agent's principal and 2) the contract expresses that the agent is
acting on behalf of the principal. 217

In contrast, if the signature is that of the agent alone, without any indication that
he is signing on behalf of another, that unqualified signature results in the agent's
personal liability. 218 In addition, when a defendant fails to indicate that he is signing as an
agent, extrinsic evidence attempting to relieve him from liability will not be admitted.219

In this case, both the FSBO and the REPC show that Chuck did not name a
216

See, e.g., R. at 8385, pp. 104:13-20, 116:23-118:20, 119:13-16, 128:16-129:6,
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217 Starley v. Deseret Foods Corp., 74 P.2d 1221, 1223 (Utah 1937) (internal citation
omitted). While the rule expressed in Starley dealt with corporate negotiable instruments,
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principal and in no way indicated that Chuck was acting in a representative capacity.
1. The FSBO does not name Still Standing and does not indicate that Chuck
is representing Still Standing.

The FSBO is the starting point of any official agreement between Aspenwood and
Chuck because the FSBO creates the obligation to pay the commission. The FSBO
defines the "Seller" as Chuck and Cathy Code and states that "Seller" agrees to pay a
commission. 220 Similarly, the FSBO's signature block states that the "undersigned" agree
to the FSBO's terms, the "undersigned" being Chuck and Cathy individually. 221 Quite
~

simply, the FSBO does not mention Still Standing Stables, LLC, by name or by
implication.
A FSBO signed on Still Standing's behalf would look much different. If Chuck
was only a representative, the FSBO would have defined "Seller" as Still Standing, not as
"Chuck and Cathy Code." And the signature block would indicate that Chuck was

~

signing on behalf of Still Standing as an authorized representative (i.e., Still Standing
Stables, LC by Chuck Schvaneveldt, its Member). And the FSBO certainly wouldn't
have listed Cathy as a seller, where Cathy had no affiliation with Still Standing.
2. The REPC does not name Still Standing and does not indicate that Chuck
is representing Still Standing.
Like the FSBO, Chuck signed the REPC without naming Still Standing or
expressing in any way that he was signing on behalf of Still Standing. Chuck is listed as
the Seller with no mention of Still Standing. The signature block does not indicate in any
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way that Still Standing is the true contracting party.
If Chuck was signing the REPC on behalf of Still Standing, he could have and
should have listed Still Standing rather than himself as the Seller. In contrast, Chuck
listed himself-without qualification-as the Seller and did not indicate that he was
accepting the offer as a representative.
In sum, Utah law requires agents to name their principal and to express that they
are acting on behalf of their principal. Because neither the FSBO nor the REPC names
Still Standing or indicates that Chuck was signing on behalf of Still Standing, Chuck can
be held personally liable as a matter of law.

3. Chuck is personally liable because he did not clearly indicate that he was
acting as an agent.
Despite the rule requiring an agent to name his principal, Chuck asserts that he can
be personally liable only ifhe clearly indicated that liability would be his alone. 222 As
support, Chuck cites Daines v. Vincent, 223 a case where an agent named his principal in
the contract's signature block.
In Daines, the Utah Supreme Court held that an agent was not personally liable
under a contract, but had signed on behalf of an LLC called ASC. 224 The agent signed his
name to the contract, but the signature line appeared directly under the heading "ASC. " 225
This clear reference to ASC meant that the parties understood that they would be dealing
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with ASC through the agent, not with the agent in his individual capacity. 226 In reaching
its conclusion, the Court stated that an agent is personally liable only if the contract
clearly indicates that the liability is the agent's alone. 227
This case is not like Daines because the FSB0 and the REPC do not name a
principal. Unlike the LLC in Daines, Still Standing was not listed in the signature block
directly above Chuck's signature. If Still Standing had been named in the FSB0 or the
REPC, Chuck's argument might carry more weight. But under Utah law, where no
principal is named in the FSBO or the REPC, Chuck is personally liable unless he clearly
indicates that he is acting as an agent.

In contrast with Daines, when a contract does not clearly indicate that the agent is
~

acting for a principal, Utah law requires the agent to clearly indicate his representative
capacity to avoid personal liability. 228

In DBL Distribution, Inc. v. I Cache LLC, the Utah Court of Appeals explained
that agents must expressly limit their signatures to their representative capacity to avoid
personal liability .229 The Court of Appeals cited multiple Utah cases where agents were
held personally liable:

•

In Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. v. Nielson, 672 P.2d 746, 751-52 (Utah 1983),
corporate officers were held liable on a promissory note where they failed
to indicate their corporate capacity in their signatures.

Id.
221 Id. 140.
228 DBL Distrib., Inc. v. 1 Cache, L.L.C., 2006 UT App 400, ,r 13, 147 P.3d 478 (citing
Boise Cascade Corp. v. Stonewood Dev. Corp., 655 P .2d 668, 668 n.1 (Utah 1982) (per
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•

In Anderson v. Gardner, 647 P.2d 3, 4-5 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme
Court stated that a corporate officer is personally liable where it is not clear
that the officer signs in a representative capacity.

•

In Sterling Press v. Pettit, 580 P.2d 599, 600-01 (Utah 1978), individuals
were held personally liable on a purported corporate check signed without
corporate titles and using an unregistered corporate name.

•

In Starley v. Deseret Foods Corp., 93 Utah 577, 74 P.2d 1221, 1223-25
(1938}-a case cited as controlling authority by the Daines Court-the
Utah Supreme Court allowed an action on a note against a corporate
secretary personally where the secretary·signed a corporate promissory note
without adding word "Secretary" next to the signature.

In this case, like the cases cited above, Chuck failed to limit his agreement to his
representative capacity. As a result, he is personally liable as a matter of law.

E. Chuck's tort claims were correctly dismissed because Chuck caused his own
damages.
Chuck asserts that if his personal-liability argument fails then his tort claims
should be reinstated. 230 The trial court correctly dismissed the tort claims against
Aspenwood for two reasons: 1) Tim Shea and Skip Wing never had a duty to Chuck; and
2) as a matter oflaw, Chuck cannot prove that Tim or Skip caused Chuck's damages.
When Chuck signed the FSBO, he acknowledged that Tim Shea was representing
the Buyer only, that Chuck elected not to be represented by a real estate agent, and that
Tim Shea's actions were for the Buyer's benefit. 231
More importantly, even if Shea had a duty, Shea did not cause Chuck's damages.

230
231

Br. of Appellant, pp. 53-55.
Ex. 5, Br. of Appellant, ,r 5.
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Causation is an essential element of any tort claim. 232 Thus, if Shea did not cause
Chuck's damages, Chuck's tort claims fail as a matter of law.

In this case Chuck has no one to blame but himself. The evidence shows, and the
trial court agreed, that Chuck's damages resulted from Chuck's refusal to provide a
general warranty deed. 233 Had Chuck provided a general warranty deed rather than a
special warranty deed, the deal would have gone through and no damages would have
occurred. As a result, even if Shea had a duty to Chuck and even if Chuck's allegations
against Shea are all true, Chuck cannot establish causation and his tort claims fail as a
matter oflaw.
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES

Utah law requires that contractual attorney-fee provisions be enforced. 234 In this
case, the FSBO awards attorney fees to the prevailing party. 235 If the jury verdict against
Chuck is upheld, this Court should direct the trial court to augment the judgment in the
amount of Aspenwood's attorney fees incurred in this appeal.

Raab v. Utah Ry. Co., 2009 UT 61, ,r 19,221 P.3d 219; Crestwood Cove Apartments
v. Turner, 2007 UT 48, ,r 30, 164 P.3d 1247 .
233 See pp. 5-6, 19, supra.
234 Wm. Douglas Horne Family Revocable Trust v. Wardley/McLachlan Dev., L.L.C.,
2013 UT App 129, ,r 14, 304 P.3d 99 (internal quotation omitted).
235 Ex. 5, Br. of Appellant, ,r 8.

232

.J

51

CONCLUSION

Despite its extensive and complicated history, this case boils down to one simple
question: Did Chuck agree to pay a commission? The jury found that he did. The
evidence supports that determination. As a result, Aspenwood respectfully requests that
the judgment in the lower court be affirmed.

DATED and SIGNED this 13th day of May, 2015.

- :

LEBARON & J NSEN, P.C.
I,

Attorneys for Aspenwood
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EXHIBIT A

Special Verdict Form

\... ·

..•

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND Jl.JDICIAL
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

HILARY "SKJP" Wll'lG dba REMAX
ELITE; ASPENWOOD REAL ESTATE
CORPORATION dba REMAX ELITE; and
ELITE LEGACY CORPORATION dba
REMAX ELIIB.
Plaintiffs,
vs.

I

I

AUG 1 3 2012
Case No. 060906802
Judge Michael D. Lyon

I

CHUCK SCHVANEVELDT,

l
I

Defendant.

;

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
Please answer the following questions in the order they are presented. If you find that the
issue has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence, answer "Yes." If you find that the
evidence is equally balanced or that the greater weight of evidence is against the issue, answer
''No."

At least six jurors must agree on the answer to each question, but they need not be the
same six on each question. When six or more of you have agreed on the answer to each question
that is required to be answered, your foreperson should sign and date the form and advise the
bailiff that you have reached a verdict.

I. Do you as a jury find that placing the names "Chuck and Cathy Code" on the For Sale By
Owner Agreement was a mistake, and should be changed so that where the For Sale By Owner
Agreement says "Chuck and Cathy Code" it should say "Chuck Schvaneveldt and Cathy Code"?

1 (

YES

NO

r.·
~} :.i. 8 00

2. Do you as a jury find that Chuck Schvaneveldt ratified Cathy Code's signature on the FSBO?

l

_LYES

NO

3. Do you as a jury find that the writings presented at trial are connected, and that connection,
together with all other evidence, shows that Chuck Scbvaneveldt agreed to be bound by the terms

oftheFSBO?

/p

..LYES

NO

(I/you answer "Yes" to both questions 1 and 2, or you answer "Yes" to question 3, please
answer questions 4 and 5 below. Jfyou answer "No" to both questions 2 and 3, stop here, and
sign and return this verdict.)

4. Do you as a jury fmd that Chuck Schvaneveldt owes a commission to the Plaintiffs?

7/

YES

NO

5. If your answer to Question 4 is "Yes,'' please state the amount of the commission owed:

s

20,ott2.fLJ
DATED this

Ji2_ day of

11.af Ui6'( ,2012.

EXHIBIT 8

Excerpt from August 3, 2012 Hearing
(stipulation to dismiss Still Standing)
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REMAX ELITE,

)
}

Plaintiff,

)
vs.
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SELLER STILL STANDING
}
STABLES, LC, EMMETT WARREN, )
PURCHASER WBL DEVELOPMENT, )
LLC, STILL STANDING STABLE, )
LC,
}
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PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
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Defendants
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Remax Elite v. Seller Still Standing Stables

August -3, 2013

Pre-Trial Conference
Page 12

1

again at the behest of the defendants.
I empathize with your position, Mr. Fuller, but I

2

3

also see the plaintiffs 1 position.

This case is six years old

4

and we need to conclude it and so I'm going to deny the motion

5

to continue.

6

the day before trial, but in the absence of an agreement,

7

where one side is adamant that it wants to go forward, I just

8

conclude that the--a motion to continue is just untimely.

If there were a stipulation, I'd grant it, even

The Court affirms the ruling that it issued on July

9

10

12th.

11

defendants, to address the Statute of Frauds as it applies to

12

who signed the agreement and what was the intent of--of when

13

the agreement was signed, but in terms of--of raising issues

14

relative to the corporation or the--the company, the LLC, I

15

just am reluctant that we get into those issues again.

16

I will allow the plaintiff--or excuse me, the

I've expressed before that I think that the

17

plaintiffs really have no case.against the LLC and I think

18

that you ought to back off of that.

19

open the door for--for issues that can be potentially

20

confusing and time-wasting in front of the jury.

21

a problem with your exploring, you know, presenting why you

22

sued the LLC as well as Chuck Schvaneveldt and Cathy Code, but

23

I think at some point, to leave them in just invites a

24

potential for the defendants to present evidence on things

25

that are just going to be confusing and distracting to the

DepomaxMerit Litigation
801-328-1188
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I don't have
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issues.
And so I would probably just appeal to you not to do

3

that, but if you leave them in, then I suppose the defendants

4

are entitled to explain why there is no claim against it.

5

whether you want to let that kind of evidence before the jury,

6

that's up to you, I guess, so you need to make some strategic

7

And

·decisions, but I think if you leave them in in front of that

8

jury, then I'm going to allow the defendants to explain to

9

e~lain why there isn't any action, because I think otherwise,

10

you're leaving them out there for exposure, when I see no

11

legal liability.

12

And so I'll allow you to talk about the Statute of

13

Frauds, but it•s going to be with--within the parameters of--

14

of the FSBO, and for the minute entry, that•s·the °For Sale By

15

Owner Commission Agreement" is what that means.

16

MR. FULLER:

And your Honor, to clarify, so we're

17

not precluded from exploring the--the facts and applying them

18

to the substantive law, with--with or without the briefing, we

19

can still, with our jury instructions that basically express

20

what we think what the law is, which is all the--all I'm

21

asking for is just virtually the law that we have in the jury

22

instructions here, which means we--we go forward, the law is

I

23

what it is, we apply the facts to the law, what's really just

1

24

being giv~n up by not a continuance is--is the opportunity to-

25

-to dig deep into the--into the substance of these two

J
I
4

I

l

DepomaxMerit Litigation
801-328-1188

I
I
I

'
'I
I
I
I
I
I
I.
I
I
I
I
I

I
I

Remax Elite v. Seller Still Standing Stables

August 3, 2013

Pre-Trial Conference
Page 14

I

1

categories, the LLC law and the Statute of Frauds--fraud law

t

2

in hopes of maybe cutting the trial of.

J

It just--it still means we can apply applicable,

3

4

relevant law that--that is appropriate-THE COURT:

5
6

little bit--

7

MR. FULLER:

8

THE COURT:

9

Well, if you--let met just help you a

Okay.

Yes.

And maybe I'm anticipating your

argument.

10

MR. FULLER:

11

THE COURT:

Yeah.
But if you're going to attack the--the

12

Court's ruling that there was a binding real estate contract,

13

if you're going to use the Statute of Frauds to attack that,

14

1 1 m not going to allow you to do that.

15

you wanted to raise, in chambers, and wanted to pursue as part

16

of your motion to continue and I 1 m just going to say, you

17

know, I may have--! may err if I--by this ruling if I had a

18

chance to consider your arguments.

19

on what you presented to me at the motion for summary

20

judgment, I think my ruling is correct.

21

want is a chance to persuade me by requesting a continuance

22

and I'm saying it 1 s just too late.

23

arguments are not timely.

24

25

Those·are issues that

I 1 m just saying that based

And--and what you

You may be right, but the

And I think that based on the arguments that were
presented and the briefing that was presented, I think the

DepomaxMerit Litigation
801-328-1188
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1

MR. FULLER:

I
I

~,

I

Court's ruling as of February 12th, I seem to remember

4

distinctly it said, when we started down some of those paths

5

and

6

had my ten points, started with the Stewart case, for example,

7

and was stopped there.

8

know, that's for another day, that's for another motion,

9

another day, that goes to liability, which--which soon--left

was--and

I

was cut off there,

I

had about ten points, I

It seems like your Honor said, you

10

me with the impression that--

11

THE COURT:

Did you ever present those in a timely

MR FULLER:

Well, that was--that hearing was on the

12

~-1.

And--and your Honor, if I may, in the

3

I

fashion?

13

14

12th, they had filed the--their second motion.for summary

15

judgment and I had my cross motion for summary judgment with

16

my ten points that I think we pretty much argued on the 12th;

17

but what I--what r•m saying is, until now, just to get the

18

arguments in, I think, for example, there•s a strong

19

substantive argument that said it hinges on the big bearing in

20

this case where the Statute of Frauds would apply.

21

statute says, was there a valid real estate purchase contract

22

and if that Statute of Frauds, there needs to be--the object

I

23

of this--or of this transaction, the piece of land owned by

1

24

the Still Standing Stables, the LLC, and with that Statute of

25

Frauds, its' so critical, because there needs to be this

I
4

I

1

DepomaxMerit Litigation
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Court ruled correctly, that the REPC is valid.
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1

written authority for any person to enter into that real

2

estate purchase contract.

3

THE.COURT:

4

MR. FULLER:

s

THE COURT:

And that's what hinges onto this--

But see, those-----this FSBO--

--all of these issues about the

6

statutory authority are issues that you raise for the first

7

time today.
MR. FULLER:

8
9

And your Honor, and--and if that•s--if

~hat's the case, I--I respectfully feel, but if it's the law,

10

your Honor, and if I can bring it up before trial, fault or

11

not fault of my own, it seems like if I can say, your Honor,

12

this--this really--this appears to be the real substantive

13

law, can we apply it to--does the--does the law come down and

14

say, well, he's waited, out of equity, he--he waited too long

15

and we're cutting you off, if I can say this is--this is

16

really the hinge of it and I feel like I'm precluded from

17

anything about whether or not the real.estate purchase

18

contract was valid, if I can't apply whether or not there's

19

written authority for any person to--to make a valid real

20

estate purchase contract.

21

precluded--

That's what I feel like I'm being

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. FULLER:

24

THE COURT:

25

The Court ruled--what is your theory right at this

DepomaxMerit Litigation
801-328-1188

Let me--let me ask one question of-Yes, sir, your Honor.
--of plaintiff's counsel.
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!

1

moment, then, if--if in fact, there is no action against the t

2

company- -

i
1

DUNCAN:

3

MR.

4

THE COURT:

I--

--what is--what is the--your legal

5

theory of liability under the FSBO--or excuse me, under the

6

REPC?
MR.

7

DUNCAN:

I-.-r' 11

say it this way, your Honor,

8

quite frankly, we would be more than happy if the Court would

9

shut off the discussion.

And this is what I mean by that:

10

The only reason at this point in time we still have the LLC

11

involved is 'cause the last thing we want to do is go to

12

trial, let the LLC out and have the argument be, they should ,

13

have gone after the LLC and change the whole course of

14

conduct.

15

If this Court is more than willing to rule or if we

16

have a stipulation here that the LLC is off limits, but as to

17

trying to get them, from our point of view and--and to defray

18

blame from Chuck and Cathy Code, we'll stipulate to that.

19

all we can have now is a trial as to Chuck and Cathy Code's--

20

or Chuck Schvaneveldt and Cathy Code's liability on this and

21

they can't throw blame at an empty chair, we won't pursue

22

Still Standing Stables.

23

THE COURT:

If

So if I make a statement in the

24

preliminary instructions that basically says that after

25

meeting with counsel and going over the evidence, that I have

DepomaxMerit Litigation
801-328-1188
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I
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1

concluded as a matter of law that there is no liability for

2

the LLC and you can look just to the other two parties for

3

liability, that's satisfactory with everybody?
MR. DUNCAN:

4

I would be perfectly fine.

i
•

t

j

I'm just

5

worried about them defraying responsibility, but if there's

6

that instruction and both parties will--will stick to the

7

integrity of that instruction and follow that in their

8

arguments and in the production of evidence, I'm happy with

9

nhat.

I've felt that way all along, I just have not been

10

wanting to jump off the fence without them jumping off, too.

11

I've always felt that way.

12

Court when we said in our motion for summary--or our motion

·13

some time ago, we don't see liability on the face of the

14

document for the LLC.

15

I'm just not jumping off the fence until they do.

I think we had candor with the

.

I stick with that, I believe that, I--

16

{Off the record)

17

THE COURT:

The--the clerk, my law clerk suggested

18

that may we could just leave them out of the instructions and

19

on the caption of the suit, but I think that it really gives

20

sort of a back drop in terms of who owned the property, who--

21

and--and how this deal was set up, but I think that if I just

22

simply indicate that after listening to both sides, I have

23

concluded as a matter of law that there is no liability with

24

respect to the LLC and therefore, you will focus your--your

25

determination of liability on Cathy Code and Chuck

DepomaxMerit Litigation
801-328-1188
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1

Schvaneveldt.

2

MR. DUNCAN:

3

think this is going to be an issue that we•ve had discussion

4

with opposing counsel on.

5

Standing Stables is not a part of this is be--is because

6

they're not a party to the FSBO contract.

7

fair statement.

8

particular case is, I don't want it to be seen as a loss and

9

now you're going--now you're going to pay my attorney's fees,

]

if you're a prevailing party to the contract.
And so, I mean, that's my concern is now, all of a

12
13

sudden, they're going to say, well, if you agree to that, then

14

you're saying you lost and you pay our attorney's fees.

15

have concern about that.

19

And I

So I--I guess what I'm saying is, I'm more than

16

willing to let-THE COURT:

Is there--is there an attorney's fee

provision in the FSBO?
MR. DUNCAN:

20

parties.

In the FSBO, yes, but it's between the

And--

22

MR. FULLER:

Yes.

23

MR. DUNCAN:

--and so my point is, ·is we're willing

24

to let them out with the caveat that the reason we're letting

25

them out is it's our position at this particular point in

DepomaxMerit Litigation
801-328-1188

.IJ.J

And the reason why I bring that up in this

11

21

~.J

I think that's a

because the only way you get attorney's fees in this case is

18

.1

Our position as to why Still

10

17

l

I'm fine with that, with one caveat, I

EXHIBIT C

Excerpt from Ruling and Order on Chuck's Motion to Dismiss
(first ruling refusing to consider Dale Quinlan evidence)

RULING & ORDER ON MOTJONS TO CLARIFY AND SCHVANEVBLDT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
COMMISS(ON CLAIMS BASED ON LACK OF STANDING AND JURISDICTION
Case No. 060906802
Page4 of JO

Defendants' Motions to Dismiss/Clarify
On June 25, 2013, Still Standing Stables ("SSS")filed its Motion to Clarify Rulings and
Identify Real Parties, and on June 28, 2013, Schvaneveldt :filed yet another motion to dismiss for

lack of standing and jurisdiction. As both motions were prepared by attorney Robert Fuller and
contain similar argwnents, the court will address them both here.
At the outset, the court expresses its dismay that Schvaneveldt and SSS continue to raise

issues concerning standing after this case has already been through a jury trial and attorney fees
have been awarded. Standing is a jurisdictional issue that can be raised at any point during
litigation. Sonntag v. Ward, 2011 UT App. 122, V2. This court, however, loses jurisdiction once
a final judgment is entered. This court entered a judgment of $212,806.70 against Schvanveldt

on January 2, 2013. lbis case is over. A jury heard the issues, and the court awarded attorney
fees to the prevailing parties. Issues regarding standing should have been raised years ago.
The Court acknowledges that Defendants, current motions regarding standing are

partially prompted by Plaintiffs, unmeritorious argwnent that Mr. Wing is not a party subject to
liability for the award of attorney fees, but a simple memorandum in opposition to Mr. Wing's
Motion to Clarify should have sufficed. This is precisely the type of cumulative end unnessary
motion that justified the significant attorney fees awarded in this case, and caused this case to
languish on the court's docket for years.
Despite the court's hesitancy to even address Defendants' standing arguments, the co~
out of an abundance of caution, will briefly address each of Defendants' arguments.
First, on the basis of"recent discoveries regarding the true ownership of Remax Elite"
Schvaneveldt argues that none of the plaintiffs were parties to the FSBO or Real Estate Purchase

7u12

RULING & ORDER ON MOTIONS TO CLARlFY AND SCHVANEVELDT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
COMMISSION CLAIMS BASED ON LACK OF STANDINO AND JURISDICTION
Case No. 060906&02
Pages oflO

Contract ("REPC''), but rather that the dba "ReMax Elite., was registered to Dale Quinlan
("Quinlan,,) at the time the FSBO and REPC were signe~ and that Quinlan never transferred the
rights under the agreement to any of the plaintiffs. Raising this question of fact concerning the
standing of the plaintiffs at this late date is unwarranted. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b),

governing motions for relief from judgment, is instructive here. It states that relief from
judgment based on new evidence is only permissible if (1) the motion is filed within three
months after the judgment, and (2) due diligence could not have discovered the new evidence in
time for a new trial under Rule S9(b). Judgment against Schvanveldt was entered in January
2013. Further, that judgment was entered based on a jury verdict entered in August 2012. Until
r .
......

this time, all of the parties had agreed that Mr. Wing was the principal broker ofReMax Elite,

the contracting party. In fact, Defendants abandoned their previous arguments regarding

standing once Mr. Wing was added as a plaintiff. Raising new factual issues nearly a year after a

Jucy trial and six months after entry of judgment will not be permitted. Even if this motion were
timely, Schvaneveldt has provided no explanation for why this new evidence could not have
been discovered in time for a rule 59(b) motion. This case was filed in 2006, and the issues
regarding the commission were first raised in 2008. It is beyond belief that Schvaneveldt could
not have discovered this evidence with due diligence.
Even if the court were inclined to consider Schvanveldt's new factual assertions,
Schvanveldt's evidence attached to his Motion to Dismiss does not contradict the presumption
that bes always been present in this case, i.e., that Mr. Wing was the principal broker associated
with the FSBO. Schvaneveldt's evidence only shows that the dba Remax Elite was transferred to

7013
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Skip Wing a short time after the FSBO and REPC were consummated. It does not show that

Quinlan did not assign the claims at some other time.
Schvaneveldt's tries to establish that Quinlan did not transfer his claims to Mr. Wing by
submitting his July 8. 2013 "Supplemental Authority and Exhibits in Support of: Motion to
Dismiss Commission Claims Based on Lack of Standing and Jurisdiction" containing an

affidavit of Dale Quinlan. Dale Quinlan states. "I do not believe nor do I have any recollection
of ever assigning any commission agreement or contract rights between myself, doing business
under the assumed name REMA ELITE, and the Seller, specified above, to any other individual
nor entity." Based on this statement, and bis own observations of the signatures, Schvaneveldt
argues that a transfer never occurred and the letters of transfer "appear to be phoney docwnents

filed with the State of Utah Division of Corporations with fraudulent intent"

Even if Rule 60(b) did not bar consideration of Quinlan's affidavit, which it does, the
court never granted leave for Schvaneveldt to file "Supplemental Authority and Exhibits,, and
will not consider it, U.R.C.P. 7{c)(l) {"No other memoranda will be considered without leave of
court"). except to note that allegations of forgery and fraud are affinnative defenses which must·

be raised in Defendants' Answer. U.R.C.P. 8. Although Defendants' Answer raised issues of
forgery and fraud with respect to the FSBO and REPC, Defendants never raised any such issues
pertaining to any Letter of Transfer; accordingly, such arguments are waived.
Second, SSS argues that because Mr. Wing argues in his Motion to Clarify that he was
not a party to the FSBO, Mr. Wing lacked standing to sue for the commission. Having rejected

Mr. Wing's arguments, however, this issue is moot. The facts and procedural posture of this
case are clear. Mr. Wing, as part of the collective "ReMax," sued the defendants for the
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commission based on the FSBO, and Mr. Wing is the principal agent of ReMax, that was named
as a party to the FSBO. Accordingly, Mr. Wing has standing to assert the commission claim.
Defendants nearly admitted as much by abandoning their standing arguments once Mr. W'mg

was added as a plaintiff.
Third, SSS argues that Elite Legacy Corporation does not have standing to sue because it
was not a party to the FSBO and did not exist when the FSBO and REPC were signed. Elite
Legacy Corporation and Aspenwood Real Estate Corporation are separate coq,orate entities that
owned the dba ReMax Elite at different times. Both corporations have been plaintiffs in this
action ever since the Third Amended Complaint was filed, and both entities were fonned by the
same principal agent, Mr. Wing. The court sees no value in drawing a distinction between them
at this time, when both entities are ultimately controlled by Mr.

Wing, who is jointly liable.

Fourth, SSS argues that Aspenwood Real Estate Coq,oration does not have standing to
sue because it assigned its commission cause of action to Tim Shea. Although "ReMax"
executed an Assignment containing language purporting to transfer "any and all claims,
demands, and causes of action of any kind whatsoever which ReMax has or may have against
Still Standing Stables, LLC," to Tim Shea, it is clear that the parties intended for ReMax to retain
the right to pursue the commission claim. Specifically, the Assignment states, ..Tim's lawyer
may represent Tim's interests and act as co-counsel for ReMax in pursuing ReMax's offensive

claim . ..." (emphasis added). Further, the Assignment contemplates that Tim Shea did not have

the right to bring the commission cause of action, stating "... the parties agree that it will be best

if Tim prosecutes, collects, settles, compromises, and grants releases in ReMax's name •..•"
Accordingly, the court interprets the Assignment as giving Tim Shea the right to collect the
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benefits of the commission claim, minus the first $10,000, and the right to direct the prosecution
of the claim, but ReMax retained the right to stand as the fonnal party asserting the cause of
action. This interpretation is strengthened by the timing of the Assignment, September 2008, the
same month that this court granted ReMax and Shea's first motion to amend but clarified that
only the principal broker could assert the commission claim. Ruling Granting Motion for Leave
to Amend, (September 2, 2008).
Lastly, Defendants insist that Aspenwood and Elite Legacy do not have standing because
they are defunct corporations, and are not "principal brokers." This is an exact replica of
standing ·argwnents asserted years ago, which Defendants abandoned because Mr. Wing was
added as a plaintiff. Defendants were wise to abandon this argument after Mr. Wing was added
as a party, and they should not have resurrected it here. Because Mr. Wing is the principal of
both corporations, and a party to this action, drawing a distinction between them is meaningless.
The parties' requests for a hearing on these matters are denied; oral argument wiU not
assist the court in deciding the issues herein addressed.
Order & Judgment

Accordingly, Defendant Chuck Schvaneveldt's Motion to Dismiss Commission Claims
Based on Lack of Standing and Jurisdiction is denied. To the extent that Defendant Still

Standing Stable's Motion to Clarify seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs' commission claim, it is denied.

To the extent that the parties' seek clarification regarding who is a judgment creditor and who is
a judgment debtor, the court finds and rules as follows:
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Ruling and Order on Motion to Dismiss based on Settlement Agreement
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HILARY "SKIP WING, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

RULING & ORDER ON MOTION TO
DISMISS ALL REMAX ELITE
COUNTERCLAIMS BASED ON
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

vs.
Case No. 060906802
STILL STANDING STABLE, L.C., et al.,
Judge Michael D. Lyon
Defendants.

This matter is before the court on Defendants Still Standing Stable, L.C., and Chuck
Schvaneveldt's Motion to Dismiss All Remwc Elite Counterclaims Based on Settlement
Agreement. Pursuant to the following, Defendants' Motion is denied.
Defendants' motion is based entirely on its new theory, based on new evidence, that a
third party, Dale Quinlan, is the true owner of Plaintiffs' claim, and that Defendants have settled
the matter with Quinlan.
As discussed in this court's July 22, 2013 Ruling and Order on Motions to Clarify and
Schvaneveldt's Motion to Dismiss Commission Claims Based on Lack of Standing and
Jurisdiction, this court cannot consider new evidence from Defendants after a final judgment
unless, pursuant to rule 60(b ), the motion is filed within three months after the judgment and due
diligence could not have discovered the new evidence in time for a new trial under Rule 59(b).
Here, judgment against Schvanveldt was entered in January 2013 and all of the claims against

L
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Still Standing Stables have Jong been dismissed. Further, the January judgment was entered
based on a jwy verdict entered in August 2012. Accordingly, this motion is untimely.
Even if Defendants' motion was timely, Schvaneveldt has not provided any explanation
for why this new evidence could not have been discovered in time for a Rule 59(b) motion.
Another fatal flaw to consideration of this new evidence.
Lastly, even if this motion were not time barred and Defendants did have some
reasonable excuse why they could not discover this new evidence earlier, settling a claim that
could be raised by a third party does not per se indicate that the plaintiffs in this case did not
have standing to assert their claims. At best the new evidence would raise a material question of
fact concerning proper ownership of the commission claim
The court does not believe that oral argument on this matter will contribute anything to
its understanding of the issues or the law. Accordingly, Defendants' request for a hearing is
denied.

ORDER
Pursuant to the foregoing, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss All ReMax Elite
Counterclaims Based on Settlement Agreement is denied. No further order pursuant to rule 7(f)
is required. The court is satisfied that this case is closed.
Q

DATEDthis~dayof ~ 2 0 1 3
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

_fJ__ day of 0~ ,2013, I sent a true and correct

copy of the foregoing ruling to Plaintiff and Defendant as follows:
Robert J. Fuller
FULLER LAW OFFICE, LC
1090 North 5900 East
Eden, Utah 84310
Attorney for Defendant
Brian P. Duncan
LEBARON & JENSEN, P.C.
476 West Heritage Park Blvd. #200
Layton, Utah 84041
Attorneyfor Plaintiff
Robert R. Wallace
KIRTON & MCCONKIE
60 East South Temple #1800
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Attorney for Plaintiff

~ffJ~
Deputy Court Cle
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Excerpt from Ruling and Order on Defendants ' Rule 52(b) Motion
(third ruling refu sing to consider Dale Quinlan evidence)

This case was tried with a jury, and so the alternative under Rule
59( a)( 4) that the Court is permitted to consider newly discovered evidence,
provides that the party bringing the motion can only produce evidence that
he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the
trial.
That is an issue which has been previously addressed, and this Court's
ruling is not going to depart from the prior rulings.
And that is, that the information specifically the documentation from
the Department of Corporations, and the information contained in that
documentation, also challenges with respect to the validity or invalidity of
signatures, and whether or not they're forged or have been cut and pasted,
all of those kinds of things were information that could, by reasonable
diligence, have been discovered and determined well before a trial was
conducted in this case.
The record is abundantly clear that these are all public records. They
have been available to all of the parties throughout these proceedings.
There have been references to the dba registration during the trial.
There is documentation in the record of the Department of Corporations
showing registrations in the corporate names of Elite Legacy and Aspenwood
Real Estate. Those are all part of the record in the public file, and they were
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all available, as well as records including the signature of Dale Quinlan,
which would put anyone on notice of his potential interest in those dbas.
And the Court speclfically rules that it is under Rule 59 that new
evidence may be considered under appropriate circumstances.
In this case, the Court's ruling is that the Rule 59 latitude for
modification of findings and conclusions does not apply and is not available.
And even if it were. available, would not be justified based upon this
evidence, which the Court rules is new evidence, which could reasonably
have been known prior to the trial being conducted.
With respect to Rule 52, which is the specific focus of the motion, and
the motion which the Court has determined to be timely, the Court's ruling is
that there is no latitude under Rule 52 to consider new evidence.
The policy underlying Rule 52 is to make sure that the findings and
conclusions that are entered in the record are consistent with the record of
the trial. And the opportunity

to amend or correct, it is the Court's ruling, is

an opportunity to ensure consistency with the. trial record, not deviate from
the trial record based upon consideration of additional evidence which was
not considered or presented at trial.

Further, with respect to these particular issues, the Court notes that
when a judgment and verdict are entered, particularly when there is a jury
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verdict entered, that any construction of the facts which may be considered
by the Court requires the Court to construe the facts that are found,
consistent with that judgment, and that if there are alternative constructions
of the facts that are possible, from the facts as they are presented, the
Court is required to construe those facts consistent with the judgment which
was entered.
And in this particular case, the Court's ruling with respect to the
present motion is that, as has been demonstrated, there is evidence in the
record of this trial, which is consistent with the determinations that were
made.·
There is evidence in the trial in this case, of the registration of the dba
in the names Elite Legacy and Aspenwood Real Estate.

And while there

certainly is documentation with respect to Mr. Quinlan's interest in the dba,
the record of the trial, by acknowledgment of movant's counsel is devoid of
any reference at all to Mr. Quinlan.

And perhaps on that basis alone, it

would be inappropriate for this Court to suggest any modification of the
finding, to burden those findings with additional information relating to Mr.
Quinlan, when none of that information was presented at trial.
Those issues would be issues that may justify a new trial under Rule
59; however that motion is not before the Court today.
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Excerpt from Ruling and Order on Defendants ' Rule 60(b) Motion
(fourth ru1ing refusing to consider Dale Quinlan evidence)

made previous rulings on those issues, and those rulings are not going to be
disturbed by the Court today. There is evidence that is even before the
Court today, including the record of the Department of Corporations, that
shows Legacy Elite as a registered owner of the dba during particular time
periods. There is documentation that shows Aspenwood Real Estate, either
as an LLC or as a corporation, as a registered owner of the dba at various
time. There are documents which purport to assign the dba between those
entities. There is a document, purportedly signed by Mr. Quinlan, that
purports to transfer whatever interest he may have had, whether that was a

bare legal title to the dba that was equitably owned by the corporation
already, or whether it was something else. That kind of information is not
before the Court. But to be consistent with the prior rulings, the Court's
ruling today is that the evidence is sufficient to maintain all of the prior
rulings of the Court with respect to the issues of standing and ownership of
the dba, and those rulings will not be disturbed. The suggestion that all of
the documentation now produced 1 and the arguments now being made, that
Mr. Quinlan, in fact, has at

an times been the

real party in interest, and is

the only party that has the right to proceed, are simply not persuasive.
The Court•s observation of this case, from the review of the
proceedings up to the point of trial and then during the post-trial process, is
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that this issue of Mr. Quinlan's ownership of the dba, and his derivative right
therefore to effectively control these claims or to transfer them, assign
them, or compromise them, is a construct, all of which has occurred after
trial. And it is a construct which is based, to a large extent, on a letter,
December 11th, 2013, that the Court has previously made reference to,
which appears to be a deviation from any recognized practice of the
Department of Commerce. It presupposes findings with respect to issues of
forgery, or cutting and pasting of documents. None of those issues have
ever been presented on an evidentiary basis to the Court, and the Court, in
light of both the timing of its presentation, the fact that Mr. Quinlan's
involvement, both in the business entity and in the registration of the dba, is
a matter of public record that has existed for many years, and questions that
the Court has raised with respect to these documents, the Court will simply
not countenance the legal argument that Mr. Quinlan is effectively the
superseding entity with respect to these claims, and that argument is not
given further legal consideration by the Court.
Similarly, the argument with respect to the necessity that the Court
determine that the judgment is void because of failure to comply with the
requirements of mediation, while there have been sugge~tions that specific
requirements of the mediation rules or statutes may not have technically
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been complied with, there's been no indication that there was any objection
made at the time, or that these issues were even raised until they have now
come up, well after trial, well after the conclusion of that mediation. And
again, based upon a construct to some extent which superimposes Mr.
Quinlan's purported rights into that process, suggesting that the failure of
his participation may also necessarily constitute a failure of the legal
sufficiency of the mediation, the Court simply will not consider those
arguments, based upon the analysis which has previously been made. And
the record before the Court is that a mediation was ordered, and that a
mediation was conducted. Whether there were technical deficiencies in that
mediation, to this Court 1s knowledge, they weren't ever brought to the
Court's attention in a manner that would have permitted the Court to
address deficiencies with respect to the mediation, or, at the time, that
would have permitted the parties to also address those particular issues.·
There has been nothing argued to the Court on those points, and the
Court rules that the argument with respect to the insufficiency of the
mediation is not persuasive; therefore, the Court's ruling is that the asserted
grounds for relief under Rule 60{b)( 4), that the judgment itself is void, are
not well taken. That objection to the form of the judgment is overruled, and
the motion for relief denied. And I believe that is all of the issues that were
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Ruling and Order on Defendants ' Rule 25(c) Motion
(fifth and final ruling refusing to consider Dale Quinlan evidence)
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND

FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF
UTAH,OGDENDEPARTMENT

Hilary "Skip,, Wing, et al,

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Still Standing Stables, L.C., et al.
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Ruling and Order on November 24, 2014 Hearing of Defendants' Rule 25(c) Motion

Civil No. 060906802

Honorable Noel S. Hyde

On November 24, 2014, the Honorable Noel S. Hyde held a hearing on Defendants' Rule
25(c) Motion. Dallin T. Morrow of LeBaron & Jensen, P.C. appeared for the Plaintiffs; Robert J.
Fuller appeared for Defendant Chuck Schvaneveldt and Still Standing Stables, L.C.; and Karra J.
Porter appeared for Third-Party Defendant Cathy Code.

Ruling

Defendants' Rule 25(c) Motion raises an issue essentially identical to an issue that the
Defendants have raised previously, i.e. the claim that Still Standing Stables, as the asserted current
owner of the dba "Remax Elite," either by assignment from Dale Quinlan or by separate
administrative determination by the Department of Corporations, owns the right to control the
judgment in this case. In past hearings, the court has ruled that the evidence and arguments
suppo1ting these assertions of Still Standing Stables were not timely brought in this case and are not
now properly before the courl.
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The court declines to modify its earlier rulings. As a result, the court rules that Still Standing
Stables' ownership or control of the judgment has not been established, and that the requested
substitution under Rule 25(c) is not appropriate.

Order

Based upon the court's ruling, the court orders that Defendants' motion under Rule 25(c) is
denied.
- - - - - - E N D OF ORDER-------

In accordance with the Utah State District Courts EfiJing Standard No. 4, and URCP Rule
lO{e), this Order does not bear the handwritten signature of the Judge, but instead displays an
electronic signature at the upper right-hand corner of the first page of this Order.
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was submitted for electronic
filing, and was thus sent to all counsel ofrecord by email:

Robert R. Wallace
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Sarah E. Spencer
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